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This thesis aims to provide a thematic analysis of the leading Hebrew dystopian 
texts in contemporary Israel and to present a broader context of utopian thought 
within which these texts are best understood. The research attempts to explore and 
examine how the various anxieties and fears of Israeli society are reflected upon 
in contemporary Hebrew dystopian novels and how the Israeli reality is 
transformed and re-imagined, by means of authors’ thought experiments, in the 
selected narratives. Dystopian fiction is an extremely useful tool for cultural 
studies inasmuch as it constitutes a direct interaction with the contemporary 
culture in that it describes an entire society suffering from oppressive and 
disastrous conditions which grow out of certain real-world social, political, and 
economic trends. Zionist utopian fiction which sought to imagine a Jewish 
homeland waned soon after the creation of the State of Israel and the local 
realities set the narrative on a much darker and more pessimistic course. Today 
many Israeli authors project a dystopian and (post-) apocalyptic future from the 
present Israeli reality by examining the current cultural and political situation. The 
thesis is, then, also an exploration of how these dystopian narratives come to 
terms with the current Israeli reality and what projections they offer us.  
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Diplomová práce si klade za cíl předložit tematickou analýzu předních 
hebrejských dystopických textů a zároveň představit širší kontext utopického 
myšlení, který napomáhá hlubšímu pochopení těchto textů. Práce se též pokouší 
prozkoumat a posoudit, jak se odráží určité pocity strachu a úzkosti izraelské 
společnosti v současných hebrejských dystopických románech a jakým způsobem 
autoři přetváří izraelskou realitu ve vybraných příbězích. Dystopická literatura je 
nesmírně užitečným nástrojem v rámci kulturních studií, protože představuje 
přímou interakci se současnou kulturou v tom smyslu, že popisuje celkovou 
společnost vystavenou represivním a ničivým podmínkám, které pramení 
z určitých sociálních, politických a ekonomických trendů současného světa. 
Sionistická utopická literatura, která zobrazuje budoucí podoby židovského státu, 
se vytratila krátce po vzniku státu Izrael a místní podmínky vyústily ve výrazně 
pochmurnější a pesimističtější vize budoucnosti. Na základě současné socio-
politické a kulturní situace v Izraeli dnes mnoho izraelských autorů předvídá 
dystopickou a (post)apokalyptickou budoucnost. Práce proto představuje způsob, 
jakým se tyto dystopické příběhy vyrovnávají se současnou izraelskou realitou, a 
představy o budoucnosti, které nám nabízejí. 
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Note on Transliteration 
In this thesis, the Hebrew transliterations follow the “general” rules 
formulated in the second edition of Encyclopaedia Judaica. The transliteration 
rules are applied to titles of books and to proper names and place names where the 
English versions are not very well known. The book titles are given a working 
translation in brackets in quotation marks or, in the event of an English translation 
existing, the title is given in brackets in italics together with the year of 
publication. The English versions of personal names, place names, and others are 
used for those which are well known in English, such as Menachem, Haredim, Ein 
Harod, halakha, kibbutz, etc. The bibliographical references are given in the 
language in which they were consulted, which means the Hebrew sources are 





Jewish utopian narratives in Israel almost completely disappeared shortly after the 
establishment of the state and were replaced instead by scenarios prophesying 
dark and pessimistic futures brought about by self-destructive human behavior. 
But what can this sudden change tell us about Israeli society and its culture? Why 
are Israeli writers hesitant to imagine Jewish utopias? How are the common 
dystopian themes, such as war, government oppression, religious takeover, and 
ecological disasters, reflected in specific Israeli literary texts and, more broadly, 
what is the importance of projecting such dystopian futures? These are some of 
the significant questions to which answers are sought in this work. 
The emergence of dystopian fiction on the Israeli literary scene, reflecting 
significant changes which Israeli society has been undergoing in recent decades, 
was dominated by four themes. Firstly, following the Israeli Declaration of 
Independence, the country was under the constant threat of large-scale military 
conflicts with its Arab neighbors, which often declared their plan to destroy the 
Jewish State. After the damaging Yom Kippur War in 1973, this threat loomed on 
the horizon more heavily than before. Secondly, the threat of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the Middle East only exacerbated the existential threat of 
complete destruction. Thirdly, the seismic internal social and political changes 
which were initiated in Israel in the late 1970s gave rise to deep anxieties that took 
hold of the left-wing liberal part of society. And finally, parallel to the rise of 
right-wing groups to power, the new trends within the religious groups, such as 
the idea of turning Israel into a halakhic state and expanding its borders to 
encompass as much of the biblical Promised Land as possible, only deepened the 
rift between the secular liberals and religious populations. In the twenty-first 
century, all of these national disaster scenarios continue to dominate in one way or 
another, but we also witness the emergence of the specter of environmental 
devastation, which demonstrates the recent preoccupation of Israeli society and 
culture with the environment. 
Structurally, the thesis is divided into theoretical and analytical parts. The 
first chapter discusses definitional problems of the concepts of utopia and dystopia 
and also explores different aspects of dystopia and utopianism more broadly. The 
discussion then continues by considering the various types and forms of dystopia, 
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drawing the reader’s attention here to the fine line between utopia and dystopia. 
We also look at fear in politics and the relationship between discourse and power 
and how these relate to dystopias. Lastly, we consider the communal aspect of 
utopianism, the kibbutz movement in particular, and its utopian and dystopian 
sides. The second chapter deals with the literary side of dystopian thought – with 
the definition of the genre, definitional boundaries and developments, and the way 
the dystopian genre relates to other literary genres, such as science fiction and 
apocalypse. This is followed in the third chapter by a brief overview of the literary 
origins of dystopia and the canonical literary works. We first examine the light 
satires in the nineteenth to early twentieth centuries and then move on to the 
nightmarish scenarios presented in the great works of dystopian fiction of the 
twentieth century. The fourth chapter then presents the most common themes in 
the dystopian literature since the 1950s. Readers will have hardly failed to notice 
that, despite what the title might suggest, the aim of this work is not to provide a 
literary critique of any of the dystopian works presented here – this we leave to 
literary critics – but instead to adopt a thematic approach focusing on themes and 
ideas and a description of actual dystopian phenomena. In Chapter Five, we turn 
our attention to the ways in which Zionism, utopianism, and science fiction are 
intertwined. A brief discussion of Jewish and Zionist utopias in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries is included here. Finally in this chapter, we seek to 
explain the non-existence of Israeli utopias and science fiction narratives. The last 
chapter aims to provide analysis of Israeli dystopian novels, chiefly focusing on 
their social and political content. First, we outline an overall thematic framework 
and then examine the socio-political background of the 1970s in Israel which 
spurred the creation of the first wave of dystopian literary texts. Finally, we 
analyze the leading literary texts in the Israeli dystopian tradition from 1969 until 
the present day. Brief plot summaries are offered in all cases because these texts 
are mostly unfamiliar and often inaccessible to English speakers, as only very few 
of them have been translated into English. The main concern of all of these 
dystopias, whether realistic or more science fiction-oriented, is with the 





1. The Theory of Dystopia 
When did the vision of the Good Place, the Heaven-like utopian oasis, turn into a 
nightmarish vision of hell on earth? When did the Garden of Eden become a place 
full of death, destruction, and decay? The idea of the utter breakdown of society 
and apocalyptic visions of the end of the world go back at least as far as the 
Ancient Egyptians.1 War, crime, death, robbery, and blood-red rivers with floating 
corpses are a few examples of a revelation, or to use the Greek term apokalupsis, 
of a possible destiny for mankind. Throughout the ages many variations on such 
nightmarish scenarios came down to us. Even today they play an increasingly 
important role in our cultural and mental world, except for the hopeful ‘after’, the 
renewed heaven on earth promised by theology. Secular pessimism is thus the 
essential feature of what we now associate with the modern phenomenon of 
dystopia.2 
The word dystopia3 is derived from two Greek words, dus and topos, meaning 
a bad, diseased, and unfavorable place, and is often presented as an antonym of 
utopia. The word probably first appeared in the mid-eighteenth century, but 
became widely used only in the late twentieth, and for which there are a few 
alternative terms, such as negative utopia, inverted utopia, or Jeremy Bentham’s 
‘cacotopia’, meaning ‘an evil place’. In common usage, these terms function as 
opposites to ‘utopia’ or ‘eutopia’,4 which are both neologisms, derived from 
Greek and coined by Thomas More. The former is rendered as a perfect imaginary 
‘non-place’ and the latter simply as ‘a good place’ or ‘a positive utopia’.5 This 
sharp juxtaposition of the terms is, however, rather problematic.6 The problem of 
 
1 Some of the earliest ancient texts that envision a time of distress and chaos both for nature and 
human society come from Egypt; these include ‘The Admonitions of Ipu-Wer’ and ‘The Prophecy 
of Neferti’. These and other ancient millennial texts are detailed in Robert Gnuse, ‘Ancient Near 
Eastern Millennialism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism, ed. by Catherine Wessinger 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 236–9.  
2 Gregory Claeys, Dystopia: A Natural History (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 3–4. 
3 As far as we know, the term, stylized as dustopia, dates back to 1747 and was coined by Lewis 
Henry Younge in his Utopia: or, Apollo’s Golden Days. Another important usage of the term goes 
back to 1868, when John Stuart Mill used it in a parliamentary speech. See Fátima Vieira, ‘The 
concept of utopia’, in The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature, ed. by Gregory Claeys 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 16 and also Lyman Tower Sargent, Utopianism (Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 4. 
4  Critics often tend to use the variant eutopia, especially when contrasted with dystopia. 
5 The history of the terms and concepts is detailed in Vieira, ‘The concept of utopia’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature, ed. by Claeys, pp. 3–27. 
6 Laurence Davis, ‘Dystopia, Utopia, and Sancho Panza’, in Dystopia(n) Matters: On the Page, on 
Screen, on Stage, ed. by Fátima Vieira (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), pp. 23–27. 
11 
 
viewing one concept as a negative mirror image of the other starts when we 
acknowledge that both utopia and dystopia are not purely literary traditions and 
that they can be defined in a number of ways. 
It should thus be noted that although the noun dystopia is often used 
synonymously with dystopian literature, a dystopia is not inevitably a form of 
fiction. Fear of the consequences of events on a global scale, such as the thinning 
of the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect, deforestation, pandemics, and the 
predictions of a nuclear winter do not belong solely in the realm of fiction. The 
adjective ‘dystopian’, then, suggests a future world where chaos and destruction 
prevail. Clearly, the word also has a very real and empirical use. For many 
authors, totalitarianism, and particularly Stalinism, is simply a form of infernal 
dystopia, a nightmarish regime created in an attempt to build unachievable ideal 
systems.7 It is this kind of totalitarian political dystopia, often associated with 
failed attempts at realizing utopian goals, which has received the greatest 
historical attention. This denotes that there are some three, often interrelated, 
types of dystopia: the socio-political, the environmental, and the technological 
dystopia, where technology and science threaten to destroy or to dominate 
humanity.8 
Further consideration would suggest that each of these forms of dystopia can 
be understood as having some kind of a parallel in utopian ideas. The conquest of 
the Americas held out the hope of remaking one part of humanity while enslaving 
the other. Another modern manifestation of political dystopia, which 
coincidentally came about in the same year, 1516, as Thomas More’s Utopia, is 
the creation of the first ghetto for Jews in Venice. But still, to imagine a utopia of 
excessive wealth, consumption, and materialism would probably result in 
environmental degradation and resource depletion. If we take a closer look at 
More’s Utopia, however, we might discover that the relation between the two 
concepts is more intimate still. Like the snake in the Garden of Eden, to use a 
biblical analogy, dystopian elements lurk within Utopia.9 The imaginary place is a 
fortified island, an imperial power with its own army, which sends out colonists to 
capture uncultivated land, driving out any of the indigenous people who resist 
 
7 Steven Rosefielde, Red Holocaust (Routledge, 2010), p. 14. 
8 Claeys, Dystopia, p. 5. 
9 In this line of thought, the Judeo-Christian myth of an earthly paradise in the Garden of Eden is a 
prototype of the utopian tradition, while the subsequent expulsion from the ‘Heaven on Earth’ and 
the human existence that follows function as a dystopian prototype. 
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them. The richness and peace of this ideal place are dependent upon war, 
expansion, and the ruthless suppression of others, that is to say, on dystopia. 
Indeed, for a contemporary reader, More’s Utopia seems perilously dystopian, not 
only in its external, but also its internal relations, relying heavily upon 
transparency, the repression of heterogeneity, and the restriction of privacy. In 
More’s time, however, such restraints would not have appeared for most of the 
readership to be unreasonable, given the security and prosperity which it has to 
offer.10 
The literary utopias following More all resonate with similar imagery. In fact, 
the suppression of individuality and diversity and the creation of unity, order, and 
homogeneity prevail in early modern utopianism and remain common themes well 
into the twentieth century. Writ large, any privileging of the communal over the 
individual will necessarily, for some, have dystopian implications – and as such, a 
utopia can be regarded as the predecessor of the Marxist type of totalitarianism. 
On the other hand, the opponents of such a view would contend that the utopia 
here is not to be considered a dystopia, because the demands it makes (such as the 
suppression of individuality) are well justified by the ends accomplished in the 
sense of a more just and equal society. Then again, we could argue that such a 
utopia resulted in Stalinism and its various forms, and in conformity, in leader-
worship, in systems of surveillance, etc.11 Nonetheless, it would be wrong to 
assume that all utopian visions tend to produce dystopias. There are a number of 
intentional communities based on a communal lifestyle in which harmony without 
coercion exists and where the enslavement and suppression of individualism is 
replaced with voluntary submission to the group norms.12 A relevant example of 
such an intentional ideal labor commune is the kibbutz, which began as a utopia 
combining the ideology of Zionism and socialism. Notwithstanding its noble 
ideals, the concept is far from unproblematic, as we shall see further on.13 The 
literary form of the idea, the focal point of this work, might not evoke similar 
anxieties in readers, as they will correctly equate ‘dystopia’ with ‘dystopian 
novel’, which depicts a negative or evil fictional regime, usually in a cataclysmic 
 
10 Ibid., pp. 5–6.   
11 Gregory Claeys, ‘Three Variants on the Concept of Dystopia’, in Dystopia(n) Matters, ed. by 
Vieira pp. 14-16. 
12 Claeys, Dystopia, p. 7. 
13 Uri Zilbersheid, ‘The Israeli Kibbutz: From Utopia to Dystopia’, Critique: Journal of Socialist 
Theory, 35:3 (2007), 413–434. 
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decline, dominated by fear and coercion.14 The paradigmatic work in the genre is 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four,15 which will be treated in greater detail 
when the origins of dystopian fiction come to be discussed.  
To further elaborate on the modern phenomenon of dystopia and the 
utopia/dystopia relationship, let us take a closer look at some forms and models of 
the political collectivist dystopia. As we have already suggested, both utopias and 
dystopias display a collectivist character – selfish individualism is sacrificed for 
the common good and social solidarity. In utopias the sacrifice is non-compulsory, 
freely engaged in, and deemed acceptable because of the benefits it generates, 
whereas in dystopias it is coerced, and even dependent upon the enslavement of 
others, virtually destroying what is valuable in solidarity. At its darkest, a 
collectivist dystopia exhibits an extreme devotion to sociability, concentrating 
excessively on the common good, and creating a despotic rather than consensual 
atmosphere. The relationship between utopias and dystopias could then be 
illustrated in terms of a scale of anxiety, with the absence of fear and relative 
peace at one end, corresponding with fear, overt coercion, and paranoia at the 
other. The collectivist dystopia generally exhibits two primary forms, the 
internal16 and the external, which could be typified by Stalinism and by More’s 
Utopia. Stalinist coercion is internal, permeating the ‘privileged’ main group, 
whereas coercion in Utopia is defined by the relationship to outsiders, who are 
repressed in order to uphold and protect the main group. However, in both cases 
there are groups which benefit from wealth and equality at the expense of others. 
An important question arises here: how many are involved on each side? It would 
not be prudent to call every society in which a majority lives a privileged life by 
oppressing a minority a ‘dystopia’. However, the point is that there is a possibility 
of treating some dystopias as utopias for a small equal elite which is dependent 
upon the oppression of many. A number of classical utopias were unavoidably 
 
14 Claeys, Dystopia, p. 7. 
15 Orwell himself insisted that the title be spelled out in words. Krishan Kumar notes that: 
“Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell seems to want to remind us again and again, is a novel, not a 
political tract […] This is one reason why it is wrong to abbreviate the title of the novel to 1984, as 
if it is a date. As a date, 1984 is irrelevant to the novel; it simply reverses the last two digits of the 
actual date – 1948 – when Orwell wrote the novel. To concentrate on the date is to treat the work 
as prophecy, and this is something that Orwell was at pains to deny. His book was, he said, a 
warning, not a prophecy. It was meant to say: something like this could happen, and it might if we 
don’t do something to stop it”. (Krishan Kumar, ‘Utopia’s Shadow’, in Dystopia(n) Matters, ed. by 
Vieira p. 20.). 
16 An internal dystopia is sometimes dubbed a carcerotopia, prison state, or slave state. 
14 
 
dependent on someone else’s labor to secure the idyllic existence of the privileged 
few.17 
Paranoia, ill-tempered hostility, and anxiety are a common denominator of 
early societies which serve as dystopian prototypes. A particular source of terror 
for these societies is witch doctors and sorcery in general. Much of their daily life 
is ritualized so that these malevolent forces could be neutralized. The Korowai 
people of West Papua, Indonesia, historical practitioners of ritual cannibalism, 
build their houses high above the ground, primarily to avoid attacks by two 
entities – the ‘demons’ that humans become after death and the ‘witches’ living 
within their own population.18 Apart from these hostile types of early societies, 
several other related models of the political collectivist dystopia are worth 
considering.  
In militarized societies such as ancient Sparta, their existence was conditioned 
upon conquest. Like war, slavery is another model, being ubiquitous throughout 
the whole of human history. Several modern totalitarian regimes, including Nazi 
Germany and the USSR under Stalin, have been described as ‘slave states’, thus 
linking state slavery with totalitarianism. The rule of fear and terror, characteristic 
of political despotism or later of totalitarian dictatorship, is another archetype of a 
collectivist dystopia. Prisons, torture, forced labor, concentration camps, mental 
institutions, and other organizations which are defined by depersonalization, 
uniformity, group discipline, and loss of identity are also popular features of 
dystopia. The last dystopian model is an exclusion of certain groups from society 
– mostly diseased populations such as lepers, which would later shift to Jews,19 
heretics, and witches. Now these last two models are closely connected with a 
relationship between discourse and power. The most influential analysis on the 
subject was created by Michel Foucault, who studied the history of practices in 
medicine, penology, and the law. He subjects all his material to a leftist critique 
 
17 Claeys, Dystopia, p. 8. 
18 Rupert Stasch, Society of others: kinship and mourning in a West Papuan place (University of 
California Press, 2009), pp. 4–6, 214.  See also Claeys, Dystopia, p. 10. 
19 Perhaps it would be more accurate to use here the term “jews”. The French philosopher Jean-
François Lyotard contrasts the real-life Jews with his concept of “the jews”, saying: “I use lower 
case to indicate that I am not thinking of a nation. I make it plural to signify that it is neither a 
figure nor a political (Zionism), religious (Judaism), or philosophical (Jewish philosophy) subject 
that I put forward under this name. I use quotation marks to avoid confusing these "jews" with real 
Jews.” (Jean-François Lyotard, Heidegger and “the jews” (University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 
p. 3) In short, he uses the term to denote the symbolic alien group, the Other, that European society 
constructed in order to persecute or expel them. 
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and tries to show how power and knowledge fundamentally interact and whom or 
what the material excludes, and how. For example, he points out that the asylum is 
driven by the discourses of the ‘reasonable’ doctor who defines himself against 
the ‘unreasonable’ patient, and, having made his judgment, proceeds to lock the 
person up in an asylum. Similar techniques are used by racists, sexists, and 
imperialists who make their ‘normalizing’ discourses prevail by creating ‘the 
deviant’ or what the postmodernists call ‘the other’. In his studies, Foucault talks 
about homosexuals, women, prisoners, the insane, or non-whites as paradigms of 
‘the other’. If the discourse gradually becomes more and more dominant in a 
society or group it may start to seem ‘natural’ and in that way justify itself by 
appealing to the ways of nature. ‘Nature’ as such can then proclaim the ordering 
powers of a god, or the hidden order discovered by scientists, or it can contain 
women, the mad, or the non-white people who are to be considered by their very 
‘nature’ to be more animal and less reasonable than ‘us’, and so forth.20 
Dystopia, crisis, collective angst, and the fear of groups are thus closely 
intertwined. It is reasonable to work with an assumption that each epoch has its 
own anxieties, which tend to predominate. From an evolutionary standpoint, we 
are sensitive, just like all animals, to possible threats lurking in our environment. 
Apart from retaining many natural fears, we tend to adopt others which are 
socially constructed.21 In groups, these fears then tend to intensify, creating mass 
delusions, or what psychologists call mass psychogenic disorder. Such mass 
delusions can serve as an advantage for some, especially in a political power play. 
In other words, some social constructions of group fears can easily be manipulated 
for the benefit of the elite.22 The state, an organized political community, is such 
an entity created by the hostility and fear one group feels about others. Fear, as it 
pertains to modern politics, is defined as “people’s felt apprehension of some 
harm to their collective well-being”; in our age it is most commonly fear of 
 
20 Christopher Butler, Postmodernism (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 45–50. 
21 A compelling anthropological argument of Gregory Claeys’s book Dystopia: a Natural History 
concerning dystopia as a psychological phenomenon which has accompanied humanity since time 
immemorial is that ‘[…] we collectively progress from natural to socially compounded forms of 
fear. At first all the natural world is populated by threatening gods, monstrous beings, and 
malevolent spirits... Many of these gradually disappear. Others are reinvented, or rediscovered as 
inner monstrosity, or replaced in later modernity by fear of the science and technology we have 
created, of the recreation of ourselves in the image of our machines, and of their eventual 
domination over us. But the fear remains constant, if fluctuating, even if its objects vary... Our 
‘natural’, original psychic state is one of constant mental anxiety.’ (Claeys, Dystopia, p. 9.). 
22 Claeys, Dystopia, pp. 10–18. 
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terrorism, crime, moral decay, a nuclear strike, technology, and dangers posed to 
our environment.23 Most of these fears, and the ways in which they are reflected 
in the Hebrew literature from the early 1970s and their literary functions and 
intentions, will be treated in the second, analytical part of this work. 
1.1. Secular Perfectionism, Millenarianism, and Dystopia 
To go to the length of imagining that we can design some plan 
for the whole society whereby harmony, justice and plenty are 
attained by human engineering is an invitation to despotism.24 
We have noted that a totalitarian political dystopia is often associated with failed 
attempts at realizing utopian goals, but a question arises here as to whether this 
implies that every utopia inevitably leads towards dystopia. Utopias seemingly 
represent the human capacity for perfectibility, which, according to many, is 
doomed to fail if considered outside theology. Many allegations have been made 
that assert that utopianism forms the basis for totalitarianism. The idea that 
utopian thinking in politics aims at achieving an ‘ideal state’ and devising rational 
plans for a way to get there originated with Plato. This perspective of utopianism 
was expressed by many thinkers, including the political theorist Karl Popper, 
whose work The Open Society and Its Enemies, published in 1945, argues that 
utopias depict perfect societies and since perfection is impossible, they must 
necessarily lead, if executed in all their details, to totalitarianism and violence.25 
This understanding of a utopia, however, is in accordance with an essentially 
religious mentality. Hence the problem with this approach is that it attempts to 
group a utopia together with religion. Although a utopia overlaps at many points 
with theology, it does not aim at perfectionism but rather at the improvement of 
human behavior so as to create substantially better conditions for a group or 
society as a whole. Indeed, contrary to eschatological visions that aim to perfect 
the whole universe, including human society, utopian visions do not go beyond 
the human capabilities. The expectation of moderate improvement in behavior is 
 
23 Corey Robin, Fear: the history of a political idea (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 1–25.  
24 Leszek Kolakowski, quoted in Sargent, Utopianism, p. 126. 
25 The idea of utopias being dangerously idealistic and thus providing bases for totalitarianism was 
also expressed by anti-communist and liberal thinkers such as Leszek Kolakowski, Friedrich 
Hayek, Isaiah Berlin, and Michael Oakshott. (Laurence Davis, ‘Dystopia, Utopia, and Sancho 
Panza’, in Dystopia(n) Matters, ed. by Vieira, p. 23.). 
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realistic and has occurred, but expecting perfection is a call for destruction. The 
failure occurs exactly because of an assumption of quasi-millenarian rebirth or a 
return to the original purity (connected here with historical necessity rather than 
God), which is essentially a religious idea. Accordingly, this suggests that it is 
also incorrect to view a utopia as synonymous with millenarianism. Many utopias 
do not require either millenarian premises or revolutionary means to be fulfilled. 
Stalinism is an example of a radical millenarianism26 as well as utopianism, and 
its call for perfect rather than improved people imitates religion rather than 
utopianism. So, to answer our question, we will rightly argue that utopia does not 
necessarily lead to dystopia, but secular perfectionism and millenarianism may 
easily do so, then. It is true that Nazism and Stalinism are also forms of 
utopianism, but they are not its only forms and there is no reason to invalidate and 
discredit utopian thinking and action as such, just as there is no reason to 
invalidate revolutions as such because of the failures of the Bolshevik 
revolution.27 
1.2. Intentional Communities 
The first Jewish utopia was a garden where, according to the Book 
of Genesis, God himself liked to stroll in the cool of the evening. It 
didn't end well. Almost 6,000 years later, in 1909, a group of young 
Jews decided to recreate that original garden in Ottoman Palestine, 
and on the southern tip of the Lake of Galilee set up a kibbutz (or 
"gathering") which they hopefully named Kvutzat Degania ("wheat 
of God").28 
 
26 Maoism in China has also been described as millennial, as it exerted immense efforts to produce 
the perfect society. 
27 Claeys, Dystopia, pp. 263–265 and The Utopia Reader, ed. by Gregory Claeys and Lyman 
Tower Sargent, 2nd ed, (New York University Press, 2017), pp. 7–8. See also Gregory Claeys, 
‘News from Somewhere: Enhanced Sociability and the Composite Definition of Utopia and 
Dystopia’, History, 98 (2013), 145–172. Following this line of argument Laurence Davis 
differentiates between what he calls ‘transcendent utopias’ and ‘grounded utopias’, distinguishing 
‘utopias associated with the imagination of and/or quest for perfection in some impossible future 
(transcendent utopia) and those associated with the encouragement of greater imaginative 
awareness of neglected or suppressed possibilities for qualitatively better forms of living latent in 
the present (grounded utopia).’ He then goes on to claim that ‘dystopia’ should not be viewed as a 
satire on utopianism as such but rather a combination of a ‘satire on existing society with a parodic 
inversion of transcendent or controlling utopian aspirations’. (Laurence Davis, ‘Dystopia, Utopia, 
and Sancho Panza’, in Dystopia(n) Matters, ed. by Vieira, p. 26.). 
28 Alberto Manguel, ‘Between Friends by Amos Oz – review’, 8 May 2013, 




As indicated earlier, the most common aspect of utopianism is the genre of 
literature, the focal point of this work, but in order to have a better understanding 
of the concept it would be misleading to narrow its meaning exclusively down to 
the literary field without offering a brief exploration of the idea and its other 
components. However, any rigid definition in this case would most probably 
prove to be problematic. As a matter of fact, there is discord among scholars today 
over how the concepts of dystopia, utopia, and utopianism more broadly should be 
understood. The argument stems from the fact that the Greek terms for non-place, 
good place, and later bad place initially referred to a fictional place, and later to a 
literary genre, but over time they have also begun to refer to other phenomena.29 
The Polish philosopher and historian of ideas Leszek Kołakowski discusses the 
complexity of the meaning of utopianism and concludes that “[i]t is an interesting 
cultural process whereby a word of which the history is well known and which 
emerged as an artificially concocted proper name has acquired, in the last two 
centuries, a sense so extended that it refers not only to a literary genre but to a 
way of thinking, to a mentality, to a philosophical attitude, and is being employed 
in depicting cultural phenomena going back into Antiquity, far beyond the 
historical moment of its invention.”30 Utopianism, then, clearly has a long and 
complex history, and while the word utopia was coined by More in 1516 and new 
words were later added to describe different types of utopias, such as dystopia,31 
the idea can be traced back to the earliest written records we have and to every 
cultural tradition.32 The division between the better and the worse in utopianism 
was also created very early on as people have always been dissatisfied with their 
living conditions and therefore have created visions of a better, longer, and 
 
28 June 2021]. 
29 The Utopia Reader, ed. by Claeys and Sargent, p. 5. 
30 Leszek Kolakowski, ‘The Death of Utopia Reconsidered’, in The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values IV, ed. by S. M. McMurrin (University of Utah Press, 1982), p. 229 
<https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to z/k/kolakowski83.pdf> [accessed 28 June 2021]. 
31 Other derivation neologisms include anti-utopia, euchronia, heterotopia, and ecotopia (named 
after Ernest Callenbach’s novel of 1975 of the same name). 
32 Like most other terms we use now, utopia refers to things that existed well before the word itself 
was coined, and so we now talk about non-Western utopias such as ancient Chinese, Egyptian, 
Indian, etc. On non-Western utopianism in general see Jacqueline Dutton, ‘‘Non-western’ utopian 
traditions’, in The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature, ed. by Claeys, pp. 223–258.  
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improved life, while at the same time they were worried about the possibility of a 
worse existence.33 
A prominent scholar of utopian studies, Lyman Tower Sargent, equates 
utopianism with ‘social dreaming’34 and within this broad category he talks about 
three faces of utopianism – literary tradition, ideology (non-fictional utopian 
social theory), and utopian practice (the tradition of communal living and 
organization).35 Indeed, the fact that utopianism, taken more broadly, contains 
what are termed the three faces is widely accepted among scholars today. 
Although scholars also often speak of dystopianism, whether there are three 
corresponding ‘faces’ of dystopianism is a contentious issue, because it is argued 
that we recognize no dystopian ideologies as such.36 But dystopias are not merely 
fictional narratives either, since the term, as we have argued, has very practical 
usages and we have recognized that communalism in particular also has its 
dystopian side.37 We therefore believe it is productive to recognize the symmetry 
between the broad tripartite definition of utopianism and any definition of 
dystopianism, which will, it is hoped, allow us to recognize key features linking 
literature, ideology, and the communal idea. 
Throughout human history many individuals and groups have attempted to put 
their visions into practice. Some of the visionaries who also succeeded in gaining 
political power turned into dictators and instead of creating utopias their creations 
resulted in dystopias, of which the most noteworthy in the twentieth century are 
Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, the USSR under Stalin, and Cambodia under 
Pol Pot. Clearly, ‘social dreaming’ has stimulated many to bring about actual 
 
33 Sargent, Utopianism, p. 4. 
34 Gregory Claeys, J. C. Davis, or Krishan Kumar, for instance, oppose restricting utopia to ‘social 
dreaming’. Claeys argues that a ‘[utopia] may both formally and psychologically have aspects of a 
“social dream” about it, in the senses of speculation, thought experiments, projection and 
extrapolation, imagined futures and/or forecasts. But it may be more helpful to restrict “utopia” to 
the less fantastic forms of the genre. For utopia has often been seen as something realizable, if only 
on a small scale, by real human beings.’ (The Utopia Reader, ed. by Claeys and Sargent, p. 3.). 
35 Lyman Tower Sargent, ‘The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited’, Utopian Studies, 5:1 (1994), 
1–37. 
36 Some scholars argue that there are ideologies which are intended to instill fear in large numbers, 
and that communities based on such ideologies exist (Claeys, ‘News from Somewhere’, History, 
98 (2013), 145–172.). Others disagree and define dystopia only as a form of literary tradition 
(Adam Stock, ‘Dystopia as Post-Enlightenment critique in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four’, in Dystopia(n) Matters, ed. by Vieira, pp. 115–129.). 
37 It is important to highlight that it would be a misconception to equate utopia with communism 
and then with dystopia. Voluntary communal property holding has been very common throughout 
much of human history and has created successful and long-lasting communities. Many utopias are 
less tied to communism and more to cooperation and profit-sharing. See Claeys, Dystopia, p. 265. 
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betterment but, at the same time, it has been misused by others to gain power, 
money, influence, and so forth for themselves, turning some utopias into 
dystopias. That being the case, it is safe to argue that utopias might be essential 
but they are also potentially dangerous. However, the form of putting specific 
utopian dreams into practice that has been far more common (and successful) is 
creating small communities with the purpose of either withdrawing from the 
majority population to implement and practice the beliefs of the members without 
interference or simply to prove to the majority society that the proposed utopia is 
practically achievable.38 
The neutrally labeled intentional communities, popularly and better known as 
communes, had many names in the past, such as utopian community, practical 
utopia, or utopian experiment, thus making a clear connection with utopianism. 
Nevertheless, many people living in such communities have rejected the label 
‘utopian’ and there are also ongoing disputes over what should be considered a 
utopia or an intentional community. Therefore, the problem also stems from the 
fact that no fully agreed-upon definition of an intentional community is available. 
Despite the rejection of the previous terms that incorporated the label ‘utopian’, 
the close link between utopianism and these small communities is evident. The 
definition of an intentional community that Sargent proposes, however, is 
generally acceptable: ‘A group of five or more adults and their children, if any, 
who come from more than one nuclear family and who have chosen to live 
together to enhance their shared values or for some other mutually agreed upon 
purpose.’39 Sargent also stresses that the most important part of this definition that 
connects utopianism with such communities ‘is the emphasis on living a life based 
on ‘shared values’ or a ‘mutually agreed upon purpose’.’40 
Intentional communities have been designed to accommodate a particular way 
of life of their members. Among the aspects and domains of life which have been 
sought to be changed, sometimes radically, are eating habits, sexual behavior, the 
work ethic, gender distinctions, and so on. Many communities have been 
established so that their members could follow their faith, or a charismatic leader, 
and live their life accordingly. Many others have chosen to follow a social 
theorist, but there are countless other reasons why people have withdrawn from 
 
38 Sargent, Utopianism, pp. 33, 126–127. 
39 Ibid., p. 6, 34. 
40 Sargent, Utopianism, p. 34. 
21 
 
the mainstream society to live differently. Every community has rules and 
regulations, and formal or informal agreements on how the members are to 
conduct their lives. In cases where these documents and agreements existed as 
fiction, we would undoubtedly call them utopias, but they are often fictional in the 
sense that they do not strictly reflect how the community actually operates. The 
earliest intentional communities are thought to have been Hindu ashrams, 
followed by Buddhist monasteries, in India, China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. In 
what became the Western tradition, the first such communities to withdraw from 
the society to practice their beliefs were the Essenes, a Jewish religious sectarian 
group that resided in various locations and presumably established the Qumran 
community in the second century BCE, where most members lived a celibate and 
communal life based on religious purity and who produced their own library, or 
what we now know as the Dead Sea Scrolls.41 In our times, such communities 
have been established in Africa, Israel, the United States, Japan, and many other 
parts of the world and have become melting pots of ideals and issues that have 
permeated the public consciousness, such as equality, civil rights, ecology, 
pacifism, sustainable agriculture, co-ops, personal growth, spirituality, etc.42 
The most fully elaborated implementation of the communal idea in the last 
century was undoubtedly the creation of the kibbutz, which has most influenced 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century utopianism and, while presenting the 
possibilities and limits of communalism, it has also had a great impact on 
intentional communities around the world. From the beginning of the twentieth 
century various intentional communities and cooperatives were established by the 
Zionist movement throughout what is now Israel, including kibbutzim, moshavim, 
and other modes of settlement which were originally mostly secular. For many 
decades the kibbutz was an exemplary model of an agricultural and industrial 
cooperative that implemented equality, voluntary sharing, direct democracy 
among its members, and the abolition of private property and a wage system. It 
 
41 Another hypothesis assumes that the scrolls do not have any connection with the settlement, but 
originated in Jerusalem. At any rate, it is safe to assume that this library was not composed by a 
single sectarian community. For further details see John J. Collins, ‘The Literature of the Second 
Temple Period’, in The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Studies, ed. by Martin Goodman (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 53–78.  
42 Sargent, Utopianism, pp. 34–35. See further Lyman Tower Sargent, ‘Theorizing Intentional 
Community in the Twenty-First Century’, in The Communal Idea in the 21st Century, ed. by 
Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yaacov Oved, and Menachem Topel (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 53–72 and 
Yaacov Oved, ‘Communes and Communities: History and Perspective’, in The Communal Idea in 
the 21st Century, ed. by Ben-Rafael, Oved, and Topel, pp. 113–129. 
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was generally successful until the 1980s, when the majority of kibbutzim 
underwent far-reaching changes, largely as a result of globalization, economic 
crisis, and changes on the political scene in Israel (the political and ideological 
decline of the Labor movement) resulting in privatization and reclassification of 
the kibbutz, individual and differential salaries, etc. The kibbutz movement has 
survived these challenges but is not as prosperous as it once was and its old 
communal and egalitarian economic and social governance has largely dissolved, 
leaving only a handful of kibbutzim still adhering to the old utopian way of 
governance.43 Zilbersheid refers to this period of changes as ‘the dystopian 
transformation’ of the kibbutz and continues to discuss the rise of ‘the New 
Kibbutz’, which was, according to him, ‘a conscious choice to build a bad 
society’. For instance, Zilbersheid argues that the differential salaries, creating 
large social gaps, are to be considered ‘a dystopian moment in the New Kibbutz – 
the deliberate building, by a leading group, of a bad society by a sophisticated 
distortion of the essence of common ownership’.44 The Hebrew literary 
imagination also illustrates both the utopian and dystopian sides of the kibbutz by 
presenting us with a clash between individual desires and the collective ideal. The 
early fiction of Amos Oz and the critical visions of Nathan Shaḥam, Avraham 
Balaban, and Amos Kenan all bring the concealed dystopian aspects of the 
kibbutz to the surface and show how a utopian society breeds dystopian 
discontent. Ran Omer-Sherman explores the literary representation of the utopian 
vision of the kibbutz and concludes that the central theme in such works ‘is the 
monumental tension between the individual and the collective, between individual 
aspiration and ideological rigor, between self-sacrifice and self-fulfillment. 
Portraying kibbutz life honestly demands retaining at least two oppositional things 
in mind at once – the absolute necessity of euphoric dreaming and the mellowing 
inevitability of disillusionment.’45  
Still, we would surely want to distinguish between the kibbutz experience and 
intentional communities and cults that are far more destructive. These 
 
43 Sargent, Utopianism, p. 55. See also Eliezer Ben-Rafael, ‘Kibbutz: Survival at Risk’, in The 
Communal Idea in the 21st Century, ed. by Ben-Rafael, Oved, and Topel, pp. 301–321 and Ranen 
Omer-Sherman, Imagining the kibbutz: visions of utopia in literature (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2006), pp. 1–22.  The old collective kibbutz is called kibbutz shitufi and the new 
privatized (or ‘renewing’) kibbutz is called kibbutz mitḥadesh. 
44 Uri Zilbersheid, ‘The Israeli Kibbutz: From Utopia to Dystopia’, Critique: Journal of Socialist 
Theory, 35:3 (2007), 430–431. 
45 Omer-Sherman, Imagining the kibbutz, p. 7. 
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communities treat their members degradingly and with violence and the 
consensual atmosphere is transformed into one of coercion. The reorganization of 
much of the peasant population into communes in China by Mao Zedong resulted 
in brutal violence that forced the population to give up their houses and other 
private property, so that by 1958 thousands of what were called ‘people’s 
communes’ existed. Forced collectivization had devastating consequences and 
many died during this period, while others who were forced to join this 
authoritarian form of communalism experienced a much worse standard of living 
than they had before. The dystopian community Colonia Dignidad in Chile, 
established by Germans and Chileans after World War II, became infamous after 
its leader was jailed for child sex abuse, torture, and murdering his opponents.46 
 Many religious sects provided the utopian tradition with successful, long-
lived, and voluntary communities but some of them which assume cult-like 
features have been headed by strong and charismatic leaders who can potentially 
influence people to do things that they would not do otherwise, including rape, 
drug abuse, and even mass killings. Dystopian communities such as Jonestown, 
the Solar Temple, Centrepoint, and others are known for serious abuse of their 
members. The degree to which this happens is often dependent upon the level of 
paranoia and anxiety and the relationship between the leadership and their 
followers. But even these dystopian communities started well and morphed into 
apocalyptic dystopias only later: the Jonestown massacre ended disastrously with 
a mass suicide of more than 900 followers and some 924 members of the Ugandan 
Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God were burned to 
death or poisoned by the leaders of the community after their predictions of the 
end of the world failed to come about.47 
  
 
46 Claeys, Dystopia, p. 214; Sargent, Utopianism, pp. 42, 64, 68. 
47 Sargent, Utopianism, p. 42; Paul F. Starrs and John B. Wright, ‘Utopia, Dystopia, and Sublime 
Apocalypse in Montana's Church Universal and Triumphant’, Geographical Review, 95:1 (2005), 
97–121.   
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2. The Literary Dystopia 
The task of the literary dystopia […] is to warn us against and 
educate us about real-life dystopias. It need not furnish a happy 
ending to do so: pessimism has its place. But it may envision 
rational and collective solutions where irrationality and panic loom. 
Entertainment plays a role in this process. But the task at hand is 
serious. It gains daily in importance. Here, then, is a genre, and a 
concept, whose hour has come. May it flourish.48 
 
Now that we have recognized a more inclusive understanding of dystopia, we will 
turn our focus to one of the possible manifestations of dystopian thought – 
dystopia as a literary genre. In discussing the literary tradition, we will need to 
address these issues – the genre definitions, the problem of categorization, the 
dominant themes and trends running through the dystopian literature up to the 
1950s, and then the major developments from the 1950s until the present. This 
brief sketch of major themes will prove useful for developing a thorough 
understanding of the Hebrew dystopian tradition, as the Israeli authors are, more 
often than not, influenced or inspired by the English utopian tradition. However, a 
detailed account of dystopian literary trends and of specific dystopian works is far 
beyond the scope of this theoretical part of the study and therefore we will 
attempt, instead, to map out only the contours of the dystopian literary tradition. 
Utopian and dystopian literature (written in English) has a varied and rich history, 
which it is not feasible to do justice to in the context of this work, but we refer the 
readers, in the text and footnotes, to a number of academic and often extensive 
works which are focused on all aspects of utopianism. The indispensable journal 
for this field, Utopian Studies, also contains discussions of numerous classical 
literary works, as well as less familiar ones, which certainly makes it a great 
reference point. Finally, it should be stressed that in providing reflections on 
dystopian literature we confine our attention chiefly to ideas and themes and less 
to literary forms. 
There have been many attempts so far to define dystopia and the closely related 
concept of anti-utopia and the disagreement over these key terms persists, mainly 
 
48 Claeys, Dystopia, p. 501. 
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because the immense variety of texts is studied and analyzed by scholars from 
different fields, such as history, sociology, politics, and literary theory, and by 
liberals, Marxists, and other critics. Moreover, the somewhat disturbing proximity 
between utopia and dystopia, which we have already discussed, is yet another 
aspect contributing to the ongoing disagreement about key definitions. We will 
present a few suggestions, made by leading scholars, on how we can understand 
these concepts while at the same time we believe that any definitional boundaries 
have to be porous, which is not to say that we do not need any definitions, but 
only that these definitions should not be there to build a fortress around us so as to 
keep anything just slightly different outside. From a historical perspective, the 
distinction between dystopia and anti-utopia has been vague and often confusing 
inasmuch as the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Some authors and 
critics oversimplify the terminology, while others make no distinction at all 
between the two terms. In his Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (1987), 
historian of political thought Krishan Kumar does not differentiate between the 
two and uses ‘anti-utopia’ as a general term. Most radically, perhaps, M. Keith 
Booker (1994) takes different concepts from utopian studies and groups them all 
under the term ‘dystopia’, saying that “[v]arious terms have been employed to 
indicate the range of skeptical treatments of utopianism depicted in modern fiction 
and film. Designations like "dystopia," "negative utopia," "anti-utopia," 
"heterotopia,"49 and "cacotopia" have variously been used to describe this 
phenomenon, though the terms have not always been employed interchangeably. 
However, rather than quibble over terminology, in this study I use the term 
"dystopia" throughout to subsume all of the others, with the understanding that I 
consider "dystopia" as a general term encompassing any imaginative view of a 
society that is oriented toward highlighting in a critical way negative or 
problematic features of that society's vision of the ideal.”50 
 
49 The word ‘heterotopia’ was first coined, in a literary context, by the French theorist Michel 
Foucault. Heterotopian spaces are transient spaces, sites of otherness, spaces which are different 
from real spaces or even inversions or opposites of them. Examples of these include mirrors, 
asylums, prisons, cemeteries, libraries, museums, boats, etc. In dystopian literature heterotopias 
represent a safe haven for the protagonists, such as memories of the past, dreams of a better future, 
or places which constitute a refuge from the dystopian reality. For further details see Michel 
Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces’, trans. by Jay Miskowiec, Diacritics, 16:1 (1986), 22–27 and Kelvin 
T. Knight, ‘Placeless places: resolving the paradox of Foucault's heterotopia’, Textual Practice, 
31:1 (2017), 141–158. 
50 M. Keith Booker, The Dystopian Impulse in Modem Literature: Fiction as Social Criticism 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 22. 
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A more prevalent trend among scholars and critics today, however, is to keep 
sharply defined distinctions in utopianism, and especially the one between the 
anti-utopia and dystopia.51 This work follows this second tendency. In the article 
‘The Three Faces of Utopianism’ (1967) Lyman Tower Sargent conflates dystopia 
with anti-utopia, but in the updated version ‘The Three Faces of Utopianism 
Revisited’ (1994) he makes a clear distinction between the two and defines a 
dystopia or ‘bad place’ as a ‘non-existent society described in considerable detail 
and normally located in time and space that the author intended a 
contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse than the society in which 
that reader lived’52, and an anti-utopia as a ‘non-existent society described in 
considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author 
intended a contemporaneous reader to view as a criticism of utopianism or of 
some particular eutopia’.53 In the same manner, Darko Suvin (2003), a Marxist 
literary theorist and science fiction critic, distinguishes between anti-utopia and 
dystopia, arguing that ‘[d]ystopia […] divides into anti-utopia and what I shall call 
“simple” dystopia. Anti-Utopia finally turns out to be a dystopia, but one 
explicitly designed to refute a currently proposed eutopia. It is a pretended 
eutopia—a community whose hegemonic principles pretend to its being more 
perfectly organized than any thinkable alternative, while our representative 
“camera eye” and value-monger finds out it is significantly less perfect than an 
alternative, a polemic nightmare. “Simple” Dystopia (so called to avoid inventing 
yet another prefix to topia) is a straightforward dystopia, that is, one which is not 
also an anti-utopia’.54 
Discussing socially critical science fictional texts (such as He, She and It by 
Marge Piercy), Sargent (1994) also suggested that we should start to consider 
 
51 For more detailed summaries of these definitional controversies see, for example, Artur Blaim, 
'Hell upon a Hill: Reflections on Anti-Utopia and Dystopia', in Dystopia(n) Matters, ed. by Vieira, 
pp. 80–91; Claeys, Dystopia, pp. 278–284; Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian 
Imagination, ed. by Tom Moylan and Raffaella Baccolini (New York and London: Routledge, 
2003), pp. 4–11. 
52 Sargent, ‘The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited’, 9. 
53 Ibid., 9. 
54 Darko Suvin, ‘Theses on Dystopia 2001’, in Dark Horizons, ed. by Moylan and Baccolini, p. 
189. Marxist theorists such as Suvin, Frederic Jameson, and Raymond Williams are all, to a 
different degree, hostile to dystopian fiction. Jameson, following Sargent, Baccolini, Moylan, and 
Suvin, recognizes two types of dystopian text – critical dystopias, which are essentially dark 
eutopias in their intent, and anti-utopias, which are the true antonyms of utopias, opposed to any 
utopian undertaking. Nineteen Eighty-Four is then one such anti-utopia for Jameson, serving as a 
fine example of the anti-utopian movement. For further analysis of this argument see Andrew 
Milner, ‘Changing the climate: The politics of dystopia’, Continuum, 23:6 (2009), 827–838. 
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using the term ‘critical dystopia’, the dark side of ‘critical utopia’, for this kind of 
work. Critical utopias came to refer to the revival of distinctively eutopian writing 
of the 1970s, which was influenced by ecological, feminist, and leftist thought and 
was represented by writers such as Ursula K. Le Guin, Samuel R. Delany, Ernst 
Callenbach, Marge Piercy, and others. This distinct imaginative exploration of 
‘better’ rather than ‘worse’ places gave the readership at the very least an 
indication of what needed to be changed in their own society while at the same 
time stressing the formal and political limitations of the classical utopias and 
presenting utopias as more of a dream and not as a blueprint. This major revival of 
utopian thinking since the nineteenth century, however, came to an abrupt end in 
the 1980s and dystopias became the prevailing form of utopian literary expression 
once again.55 The term ‘critical dystopia’ was first used by Sargent and Raffaella 
Baccolini, but Tom Moylan gave it an extensive theoretical elaboration in his 
book Scraps of the Untainted Sky, where he argued that it was a recent 
development characteristic of the late 1980s and the early 1990s.56 Moylan also 
contributes to the discussion by pointing out in this study how utopian and 
dystopian scenarios are intertwined within particular texts (which further 
problematizes the categorization of such texts).57 In the introduction to the book 
Dark Horizons (2003) Baccolini and Moylan claim that the critical dystopia is a 
text ‘that maintain[s] a utopian impulse. Traditionally a bleak, depressing genre 
with little space for hope within the story, dystopias maintain utopian hope outside 
their pages, if at all; for it is only if we consider dystopia as a warning that we as 
readers can hope to escape its pessimistic future. This option is not granted to the 
protagonists of Nineteen Eighty-Four or Brave New World… the new critical 
dystopias allow both readers and protagonists to hope by resisting closure: the 
ambiguous, open endings of these novels maintain the utopian impulse within the 
work’.58 Sargent, later adding critical dystopias to his list of definitions, defines 
them in a similar vein: ‘a non-existent society described in considerable detail and 
normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous 
reader to view as worse than contemporary society but that normally includes at 
 
55 Dark Horizons, ed. by Moylan and Baccolini, p. 2. 
56 Tom Moylan, Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination, ed. by 
Raffaella Baccolini (Peter Lang, 2014), pp. 239–240. 
57 Tom Moylan, Scraps of the Unpainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, Dystopia (Westview Press, 
2000), pp. 183–199. The same observation is made by Sargent (1994) regarding the work He, She 
and It. 
58 Dark Horizons, ed. by Moylan and Baccolini, p. 7. 
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least one eutopian enclave or holds out hope that the dystopia can be overcome 
and replaced with a eutopia”.59 Following this line of thought Fátima Vieira then 
determines the success of dystopias on the basis of whether they provide us with 
hope, arguing that ‘[d]ystopias that leave no room for hope do in fact fail in their 
mission’.60 The prevailing consensus is that the ‘critical dystopias’ today, that is, 
dystopias which include such elements as hope, are hardly a scarcity. Contrary to 
this view which classifies and determines the merit of dystopias according to their 
‘hope’ index, Gregory Claeys argues that the secondary sources often generalize 
from rather narrow textual analysis (which his voluminous work attempts to 
remedy) and then concludes that ‘literary dystopias are understood as primarily 
concerned to portray societies where a substantial majority suffer slavery and/or 
oppression as a result of human action […]. Some ‘critical dystopias’ (post-c. 
1970) also suggest that such systems might be overthrown internally. But this 
does not imply a ‘utopian’ counter-proposal, only an alternative to dystopia, 
which may also be the status quo ante […] we can agree that ‘anti-utopias’ should 
be separated from dystopias insofar as the former reject utopianism as such, 
whereas the latter do not, or do so more obliquely. This definition does not 
privilege texts which retail ‘hope’, or those which propose utopian as opposed to 
non-utopian alternatives’.61 In fact, many dystopias end disastrously with defeat, 
leaving us with no hope, but despite the fact that such texts may not hold out hope 
for a better future (especially within the text itself), they still carry an important 
didactic message – a message that serves as a cautionary example. Finally, 
contrary to previous definitions of anti-utopias, Claeys contends that the texts 
which oppose one type of utopia (and not utopianism as such) are not necessarily 
anti-utopias or even dystopias – that is, some texts can still be considered utopias 
even if they take issue with another specific utopian text.62 
While these definitions help us understand various problems, at the same time 
they reveal further definitional difficulties. Dystopia is sometimes dubbed as the 
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‘utopia’s twentieth-century doppelgänger’ and defined, perhaps aptly, as ‘a utopia 
that has gone wrong, or a utopia that functions only for a particular segment of 
society’.63 The concept of ‘utopia’ is often understood as a ‘better’ place and 
dystopia as a ‘worse’ place, which certainly holds true for the disaster and (post-) 
apocalyptic dystopian novels, but this understanding results in some logical 
problems when we realize that a great number of dystopian works grow out of 
social, political, and economic trends. Provided that the reality that is depicted is 
labeled as ‘worse’, the immediate questions that arise here are: worse for whom? 
And worse than what? Surely, the reader’s perspective could be taken into 
account, but the readership always includes different societies, groups, and 
individuals and therefore it is unclear when the ‘worse’ applies (as an oft-quoted 
statement goes, ‘one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter’ and so ‘one 
person’s utopia is another’s dystopia’) – perhaps to avoid this ambiguity it would 
be helpful here to simply specify this to mean ‘for the majority’. Defining the 
work from a reader’s perspective is thus relative to time and space, and to matters 
such as social position, ethical values, and other various factors. A different 
approach to literary dystopias is through authorial intention – an approach that is 
also problematic, as the authorial intention is often unclear. Another approach 
among critics highlights the historical context in which the author lived. Finally, 
the content or narrative approach emphasizes the need to look at the social 
relations and level of oppression (and estrangement) portrayed in the specific 
literary text.64 
Some of the approaches are more problematic than others, but all of them are 
connected or overlap and, most importantly, all of them need to enter the 
discussion in the process of the interpreter’s analyses of the text for a subtle 
treatment of the tradition. To sum up, we can agree that it is necessary to make a 
clear distinction between the critique of the contemporary society as expressed in 
dystopias, which often implies or even insists on a need for change, and the 
criticism of the very idea of wanting to imagine a perfect or a better world, which 
explicitly or implicitly calls for the preservation of the current state of affairs – as 
Andrew Milner puts it: ‘anti-utopias are normally not dystopian fictions at all, but 
straightforwardly panglossian affirmations that we already live in the best of all 
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possible worlds’.65 Therefore we concur with the authors who distinguish the 
dystopia, cautionary in nature and presenting a future in which some aspects of 
the here and now have continued and deteriorated, from the anti-utopia, which 
also presents a dismal look at the future, but is specifically intended as a criticism 
of utopianism (or sometimes a specific utopia). 
Finally, the last issue which needs to be addressed when it comes to 
categorization is the association of dystopias with the greater literary genre of 
science fiction and novels of apocalypse, cataclysm, and natural disaster – many 
of which are variants of millenarianism and are not dystopian as such. Literary 
dystopias may happen before or after an apocalypse or a natural disaster, but like 
the utopia, a key aspect of a dystopia’s distinctiveness is the portrayal of social 
and political relations – it is also less important where (and when) the dystopia is 
projected, be it galaxies in space, remote islands, or underground.66 If the concern 
of a critic is exclusively with the more realistic types of dystopian scenarios, it is 
in order to refine the definition even further in order to separate it from the much 
larger field of science fiction – surely not an easy task, given that science fiction 
has proved to be even more difficult to define and thus no agreed definition has 
been established.67 Although the utopian genre precedes that of science fiction and 
for the most part it is, in its origins, generally not related to it, the popularity of 
science fiction has increased so dramatically recently that it has engulfed many 
other genres, including, by the mid-twentieth century, both utopia and dystopia. 
Some authors avoid subsuming utopia and dystopia under the greater genre of 
science fiction, arguing that science fiction is largely indifferent to social and 
political issues and organizations which are central to utopian literature and also 
that the predominance of science and technology does not make the fictional work 
necessarily science fiction as long as these elements are portrayed realistically. 
The critics that talk of a dystopian science fiction subgenre maintain that the 
advancement of science allowed science-related themes to move from the science 
fiction domain into that of dystopia – Philip Wegner thus goes as far as calling 
dystopias ‘one of the most significant subgenres of modern SF’.68 The dystopias 
after the 1950s progressively rely more and more on scientific and technological 
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tropes to advance their vision of the future or alternative reality because, just like 
in science fiction, the authors often extrapolate from current trends into the future 
(sometimes far beyond the frontier of plausibility). The fact that technology is so 
pervasive in SF is ‘because every technological innovation affects the structure of 
our society and the nature of our behavior. Technology has repeatedly been 
associated with the future by SF, but it does not follow that the fiction is therefore 
about the future. The crudest reading of an SF novel is to ask ‘did Arthur C. 
Clarke get it wrong?’ Science fiction is about the writer’s present in the sense that 
any historical moment will include its own set of expectations and perceived 
tendencies. The futures represented in SF embody its speculative dimension. In 
that sense, as Joanna Russ has explained, it is a ‘What If Literature’.69 We can 
therefore see why some scholars consider dystopias to be so important to the SF 
field. Nonetheless, there are dystopias and utopias that do not adhere to this model 
(even after the 1950s) and are largely focused on power relations in clear social 
and political terms and submerging them in the science fiction domain is an 
inaccurate move.70 Still, we cannot disregard the fact that all the major works of 
utopian literature of the past few decades show the extent to which science fiction 
is intertwined with the utopian and dystopian imagination – following Darko 
Suvin’s definition of science fiction as ‘literature of cognitive estrangement […] 
whose main formal device is an imaginative framework alternative to the author’s 
empirical environment’,71 Moylan, discussing utopian literature since 
approximately the 1960s, argues that ‘utopia and science fiction are most 
concerned with the current moment of history, but they represent that moment in 
an estranged manner. They restructure and distance the present not to a misty past 
nor to an exotic other place but rather to that one place where some hope for a 
better life for all humanity still lingers: the future’.72 Lars Schmeink talks about 
science fiction and dystopias as examples of the ‘utopian imagination, whose job 
is at heart akin to that of the sociological imagination’, and like Moylan, argues 
that ‘dystopian and science fiction literature, film, television, and video games (as 
well as other media) are only outwardly concerned with the future; their main 
concern rather is with the present and with developments within contemporary 
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society and how they influence human lives’.73 Ultimately, we can conclude, then, 
that it is unfeasible to study the dystopias of the past fifty years without 
acknowledging the central role of science fiction. 
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3. The Origins of Dystopian Literature 
This […] was the message of the book – This is possible: for 
heaven’s sake be careful.74 
 
The history of the dystopia, apart from being much younger than that of the 
utopia, is not associated with one specific text or distinct tradition. The dystopias 
on the page, in the style of those associated with the end of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, first start to appear in the period of the French 
Revolution. The germ of the literary dystopia, however, seems to have been 
satires upon the Enlightenment notion of a life lived according to the principles of 
science and reason – of these the most influential and enduring was the work of 
Irish satirist Jonathan Swift, Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World 
(1726), better known as Gulliver’s Travels. Other agreeable examples of satires of 
this kind are Voltaire’s Candide (1759), a lampoon of the Enlightenment belief in 
the idea of progress, and later Samuel Butler’s Erewhon (1872), a satirical attack 
on the British attitudes of the time towards science, technology, and religion. 
Since the very inception of the genre, dystopias have therefore been targeting the 
meta-narratives of Modernity, such as science, reason, the idea of progress, faith 
in the future, and later revolution and socialism. We can really witness the 
beginning of this dialectical relationship between utopian thinking and the 
fictional anti-utopian and dystopian response with the French Revolution, which 
brought both fictional utopian works inspired by the leading trends of the time and 
a deluge of fictional satirical responses attacking the set of notions loosely 
described as perfectibility. This first wave of proto-dystopian fictional texts 
culminated in the gothic novel of Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (1818), subtitled 
The Modern Prometheus – a title that reminds us of the consequences of humans 
‘playing God’. The work, considered by some to be a founding text of the science 
fiction genre and partially a satire on the failures of the Revolution, signals one of 
the main themes of later dystopian literary works – the dangers of unrestrained 
science or scientists. From that point on, the theme of science and technology 
becomes increasingly more common and from the beginning of the twentieth 
century the dystopian mode of expression, often formally situated within the genre 
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of science fiction, starts to dominate the utopian literary scene.75 Moreover, this 
period also presented us with the first secular versions of the Apocalypse – a 
noteworthy example being The Last Man (1826), also written by Mary Shelley, 
describing a global plague which has eradicated the human race by the year 2100. 
It seems the novel has aged well as it has certainly something to say to the 
readership of 2020-21, years in which the world is dealing with the global 
pandemic and its effects. The novel however is more of an apocalyptic fiction and 
less of a dystopia since the disaster is not caused by human action and neither are 
the sociopolitical aspects of the catastrophe considered within the text itself.76 
Another significant shift in utopianism which begins in the second half of the 
eighteenth century is marked by imagining the utopia not as a place to be 
discovered on the present-day earth or in the divine world beyond, but as a place 
to be created – firstly, by the end of the eighteenth century there was little left 
unexplored on the surface of the earth and so the prospects of discovering a ‘no-
place’ became bleak, and secondly, with the dawn of the Enlightenment man 
became aware of the power of reason and scientific progress and understood that 
he was the architect of his own future. Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth 
century the idea of ‘no-place’, with its spatial possibilities exhausted, was largely 
displaced by euchronia, ‘the good time coming’, that is, a shifting of utopia into 
the future – a process which Reinhart Koselleck calls ‘the temporalization of 
utopia’.77 
Four major themes, which would often intermingle, define dystopian literature 
in the last decades of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century: 
Social Darwinism, which claimed to apply Darwin’s theory of natural selection to 
the socio-political sphere, and in particular in the form of eugenics or the 
improvement of the human population through selective breeding; the destructive 
potential of scientific and technological inventions; the looming threat of socialist 
revolution and the terror it implied; and, more generally, the social consequences 
of mechanization. These themes herald an important change in the dystopian 
literature – the real possibility of such nightmarish scenarios makes lighter satire 
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more difficult, and the seriousness of the situation only intensifies after World 
War I.78 Many ‘utopian’ works were written that reflected either positive eugenics 
(selective breeding for certain characteristics) or negative eugenics (selective 
breeding to eliminate certain characteristics). Both of these approaches tend to be 
associated today with dystopias79 either because of disagreements over the traits 
chosen or because of the potential of the misuse of the power to make such 
choices.80 Racial wars, racism, and anti-Semitism are not at all uncommon themes 
in the ‘utopias’ of this period, and some, such as William Hay’s Three Hundred 
Years Hence (1881), speak of the elimination of all non-white people.81 Many 
other texts describe socialist revolution gone wrong, resulting in poverty, the 
destruction of individualism, and the creation of dictatorships, and sometimes 
combine both these socialist themes and eugenics. One of the most prolific and 
prominent authors of the earliest science fiction dystopias is H. G. Wells, whose 
The Island of Dr Moreau (1896) can be considered an exemplary type of eugenic 
dystopia. The work, a reworking of the Frankenstein motif, focuses on the 
scientific control of genetic development by portraying a mad scientist who 
vivisects people and animals, thus creating human-like hybrids. The theme of 
people falling into or rising above their animal nature is also present in Wells’ 
downbeat depiction of the future of the human species in his time travel tale The 
Time Machine (1895). The novel, set nearly a million years in the future, portrays 
humans who evolved into two separate and distinct human species, the above-
ground remnants of the aristocracy, the feeble and simple-minded Eloi, and the 
subterranean slave race the Morlocks, who prey on them. Wells’ bleak prophecy 
about the ultimate extinction of the human race on the planet recognizes the 
political predicament of the class situation of his times and parodies both the 
Marxist position and the idea of selective breeding. These themes and other 
extrapolations of current trends reappear in some of Wells’ major works that 
followed, particularly in The Invisible Man (1897), The War of the Worlds (1898), 
and When the Sleeper Wakes (1899).82 Wells, however, produced many other 
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works which are not necessarily dystopian – he tried his hand at prehistoric 
fiction, planetary disaster fiction, lunar voyage fiction, and future war fiction, and 
finally he wrote a number of prescient futuristic utopias, from A Modern Utopia 
(1905) to The Shape of Things to Come (1933) – the latter became the best-known 
English literary utopia at that time and in it Wells argued for a technocratic 
‘World State’.83 While the works vary greatly, the central themes remain – the 
preferability of a world government and the conflict between capitalism and 
socialism, how to solve it, and what could happen if it is not solved.84 Wells’ 
works had a great influence, direct or indirect, on subsequent writers such as E. 
M. Forster and the writers who produced the classics of the dystopian genre: 
Yevgeny Zamyatin, Aldous Huxley, and George Orwell. Forster’s ‘The Machine 
Stops’ (1909), perhaps more related to our own age of smartphones, the internet, 
and virtual reality than to the twentieth century, is a reaction to the Wellsian 
inheritance and in particular to his belief in scientific technocracy – this Wellsian 
machine civilization would later also come under fire in the dystopian fiction of 
Huxley and Orwell. ‘The Machine Stops’ is a depiction of an imaginary ‘reality’ 
where humanity has withdrawn from the surface of the earth to live isolated in 
vast subterranean cities which are run by the omniscient Machine. The characters 
in the story become completely forgetful of their human aspects and, unaware of 
their unnatural condition, they prefer the simulation of reality to the real world 
itself.85 
The most successful of the early twentieth-century anti-utopian dystopias86 
was, however, Zamyatin’s novel We (written in Russian in 1921, translated into 
English in 1924) targeting the collectivist mentality, scientific positivism, and 
totalitarian rationalization, and presenting a negative vision of the possible 
realization of Utopia. The novel takes the form of a diary and depicts the One 
State, headed by the unanimously elected ‘Benefactor’, which dominates the 
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entire planet and has managed to eliminate privacy – the citizens, kept under 
constant surveillance, live in glass apartments and their names have been replaced 
by numbers thus depriving them of their unique, individual identities. The 
population, supervised by ‘guardians’, is forced to dress in uniforms and is 
allotted two ‘personal hours’ for non-work activities, one food item per day, and 
‘sexual days’ which are designated by the Sexual Bureau. The daily lives of the 
citizens are therefore managed with an arithmetical precision and the One State is 
ruled by science and mathematicians as much as by the autocratic ‘Benefactor’. 
The protagonist of the story, D-503, is seduced, both sexually and politically, by a 
femme fatale into the cause of rebellion, but the resistance is eventually 
suppressed and D-503 is lobotomized into subjection by the ‘Benefactor’. The 
futile individual and collective resistance, suppressed by the One State, is one of 
the major aspects which unite Zamyatin’s and Orwell’s literary representations.87 
The mid-twentieth century, characterized by the general disillusionment with 
both capitalism and socialism, the problematic of despotic collectivism and 
authoritarian leadership looming in divided Europe, and the negative impacts of 
the emerging human-machine civilization, gave rise to a number of dystopian 
literary responses to these developments, two of which would become classic 
examples of the genre: Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) and Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (1949). Brave New World portrays the future World State, 632 years 
‘After Ford’, which succeeded in maintaining social stability through the strict use 
of eugenic engineering and a stratified class society, the abolition of personal 
freedom and property, the consumption of the freely available drug soma, and 
obligatory participation in sexual and other distractions. The story can be read as 
either a perfect world utopia or as its dark alter ego, a dystopia, depending on the 
point of view of the reader. It is not, however, a typical dystopia, as these are 
usually dominated by fear in the form of pain, cruelty, slave labor, and mass 
murder, but rather it would be more apt to use the term ‘hedonistic dystopia’ as it 
‘has abolished original sin – and, according to Huxley, the creativity that comes 
from confronting it. There is no guilt about sex or any other form of “instant 
gratification”. For all pain or anxiety there is the drug soma. There is no striving, 
no unhappiness that comes from unachieved ambition. Everyone fits snugly into 
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their place in society, genetically decanted into “types” in the laboratory and then 
further conditioned by sleep-teaching and the mass media. Brave New World has 
achieved prosperity, security and stability; what more could anyone desire? It is a 
hedonistic paradise, a utopia of consumption that Huxley in his old-fashioned way 
wishes to spoil by presenting it as a dystopia’.88 The work is therefore not so 
much a criticism of totalitarianism, but instead it presents a critique of consumer 
capitalism, abuses of science, and Fordism since ‘it takes as its target certain 
strands which Huxley regarded as inherent in modernity as such, especially the 
scientific application of the psychology of propaganda, indoctrination or the 
manipulation of behaviour’.89 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, on the other hand, presents a very different 
kind of dystopian world-state – a totalitarian regime where the ‘[c]onsent rests 
upon punishment and fear rather than the manipulation of pleasure [and] 
[c]onformity is instilled by routine practice rather than eugenic conditioning’.90 
Nevertheless, the suppression of individuality and the futility of attempts at 
resistance remain the central themes in both texts. Nineteen Eighty-Four is 
generally interpreted by scholars and critics as both a sharp criticism of 
totalitarianism and an attack on certain aspects of capitalism and modernity. The 
major and most powerful theme in Orwell’s magnum opus is perhaps the 
corruption of the socialist movement by the lust for power and the problem of 
leadership – yet the work, as Orwell himself claimed, is not intended as a criticism 
of Socialism as such. The novel portrays a failed attempt at rebellion by the 
protagonist Winston Smith, who lives in Oceania under the constant threat of 
surveillance by the state power and Big Brother, which requires the expression of 
complete loyalty by avoiding ‘facecrime’ and ‘thoughtcrime’, learning 
‘doublethink’, participating in ‘Hate Week’, and even by the suppression of 
individualism and eroticism.91 The incessant rewriting of the past is another theme 
running through the novel – Winston is employed to remove any inconsistencies 
in Big Brother’s official account of history. At the end of the novel, Winston, 
whose main crimes were keeping a diary and having a sexual affair with the 
femme fatale of the story, Julia, is caught, tortured, and brainwashed into loving 
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Big Brother – an ending reminiscent of Zamyatin’s We. Despite the text being the 
most pessimistic of the three major novels mentioned here, some critics consider 
the appendix ‘The Principles of Newspeak’ as expressing a glimmer of hope as a 
result of it seemingly being written after the collapse of Big Brother.92 
In short, both Orwell and Zamyatin captured the real horrors of the twentieth 
century far more accurately than Huxley and his materialistic civilization. 
However, given the retreat of Communism at the end of the twentieth century and, 
to some degree, the similar retreat of authoritarian regimes, it is Huxley’s Brave 
New World, with its powerful description of the behavioral psychology of 
consumer society, which seems to have remained the most relevant over the years. 
As Krishan Kumar rightly points out: ‘[i]n selecting consumerism, in the broadest 
sense, as the major development of contemporary capitalism, Huxley had showed 
himself the most perceptive of the dystopian writers. Power is there, but it prefers 
to exercise itself in ways that evade our recognition and hence resistance. Foucault 
would surely have understood’.93 
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4. Dystopian Trends after the Second World War 
We live in a world shaped by capitalism in its global stage, generally 
subject to authoritarian power (be it soft or hard, be it wrapped in 
an aura of democracy or served straight in varying degrees of overt 
control). In this world, nature (humanity included) is alienated, 
reified, exploited, oppressed and ultimately destroyed in some way 
or other. In this world, ecological, economic, political and cultural 
crises are increasingly the norm. The name of this world is dystopia 
(over against the misrepresentation of itself as utopia). While there 
are no dominant pictures of a Big Brother, there are the now 
familiar slogans: there is no alternative, history is over. 94 
 
The philosopher Slavoj Žižek writes in the introduction to his book Living in 
the End Times that the contemporary world is facing four main threats: ‘the four 
riders of the apocalypse’, namely ‘the ecological crisis, the consequences of the 
biogenetic revolution, imbalances within the system itself (problems with 
intellectual property; forthcoming struggles over raw materials, food and water), 
and the explosive growth of social divisions and exclusions’.95 Following the 
conclusion of World War II, humanity entered the atomic age and the threat of 
nuclear warfare and complete annihilation, intensified during the Cold War, 
became a common theme in the dystopian imagination. Despite the hopes for 
continuous improvement promised by the scientific and technological discoveries 
and innovations in domains such as space exploration, electronics, computing, 
robotics, and genetics, the looming threat of catastrophe outweighed the utopian 
impulses. The portrayals of political collectivism and totalitarian leadership 
slowly dwindle from the 1960s and are replaced by pessimistic narratives of 
nuclear devastation, overpopulation, famine, neo-liberalism with its hedonistic 
consumerism and free-market world, cultural degeneration, global threats such as 
terrorism and pandemics, and environmental collapse. Moreover, starting from the 
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1980s, feminism, gender relations, and concerns about gender identity and 
misogyny also begin to play a crucial role in the dystopian literary imagination.96 
In continuity with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century dystopias, the 
increasing confrontation of humanity with technology and the potential loss of 
humanity, identity, and free will dominate both science fiction and the dystopian 
discourse from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The ability of 
technology to render social relations increasingly transparent connects both earlier 
dystopian concerns with the threat of surveillance and the present-day digital age 
with its advanced techniques of a substantial portion of the population being 
observed and monitored by governmental organizations. The age of the internet 
also brought about surveillance capitalism, in which the constant tracking of our 
everyday activities is analyzed and monetized and the personal data that are 
collected are then used by advertisements, social media companies, and politicians 
to manipulate us.97 Many authors also express their skepticism about scientific 
and technological advances in the areas of robotics, organ replacements, genetic 
engineering, and cyborgization by producing dystopian warnings about the loss of 
human nature and the moral and ethical dimensions of the biotechnological 
revolution.98 
With regard to governance, the literary dystopias concerned with totalitarian 
regimes are replaced by depictions of enslavement to corporate dictatorships and 
neoliberal ideological attacks on centralized governments and on welfare and 
regulatory states acting as mediums in providing social justice and democratic 
well-being. This dystopian shift in representation might not be surprising, 
considering that if ‘the ruling ideas of an era are those of its ruling forces, then the 
narrative step from state to economy as the motor of society can be read at its least 
self-conscious register as a symptomatic echo of neoliberal hegemony’.99 While 
the wealthy few enjoy luxury and their privileged status, the rest of humanity is 
left to its fate, fighting for sheer survival. The plutocratic dystopias are hardly a 
scarcity. The main attribute of literary dystopias which diminishes the bleak 
projections and the reality of these threats is ‘their insistence on the necessity for 
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happy endings, imagining deviant rebels who beat the system, implausibly 
rescuing their central characters, and providing ‘hope’ in the persistence of 
utopian enclaves, the birth of children, and the like’.100 This ‘critical’ attitude in 
dystopian texts, however, has become more and more sporadic recently, moving 
rather towards a post-apocalyptic despair and so from the end of the twentieth 
century ‘dystopias are often less concerned with how plutocratic or collectivist 
regimes emerge and function, and more focused on how the Apocalypse feels, and 
whether it brings out our better or (as commonly) our less desirable attributes, 
both individually, when the monsters within are released, and in the groups which 
increasingly dominate us’.101 The theme of groups as exercising control over us 
and the threat to the idea of individuality often connects various manifestations of 
dystopianism, both fictional and real-world.102 
  
 







5. Zionism, Science Fiction, and the Utopian Ideology 
Science fiction literature at large and the literary utopias and dystopias in 
particular,103 often science fiction-oriented, constitute a direct interaction with 
contemporary culture. Science fiction lies at the crossroads of technological, 
scientific, critical, and social thought in that it determines what the authors 
conceived of as possible in and for our future. Analyzing the collective fears and 
desires represented in such fictional works educates us about the present and 
about the social realities which act as stimuli for the science-fictional imagination. 
Utopianism, as a cultural discourse, has always been a reflection of the political 
and social issues of its time.104 In the article ‘Marxist theory and Science Fiction’ 
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay points out: ‘[i]n its simplest terms, sf and utopian fiction 
have been concerned with imagining progressive alternatives to the status quo, 
often implying critiques of contemporary conditions or possible future outcomes 
of current social trends.’105 Similarly, in his book Seven Beauties, he writes about 
sf as ‘not a genre of aesthetic entertainment only, but a complex hesitation about 
the relationship between imaginary conceptions and historical reality unfolding 
into the future.’106 
Doreet LeVitte-Harten argues that, despite science fiction being a literary mode 
and Zionism a political movement, both can be considered as ‘projects’ which 
converge in a place of their ideological background. She then continues to discuss 
their mutual parameters: ‘the sense of wonder’ containing an element of 
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catastrophe – in Zionism the sense of wonder is evoked through the narrative of 
returning after thousands of years back to the Promised Land and the catastrophe 
through the phenomenon of Jewish messianism; both projects rely to a certain 
degree on colonial ideology; and lastly both share the meta-narrative of progress 
and expansion.107 The emergence and proliferation of Jewish speculative fiction in 
the form of utopias in the late nineteenth century and at the beginning of the 
twentieth108 come, then, perhaps as no surprise. The first imagined utopian Jewish 
homeland appears in Moses Hess’s Rome and Jerusalem: The Last National 
Question (published in German in 1862), which envisions the establishment of a 
Jewish socialist nation-state in Palestine as a part of a greater socialist revival of 
humankind that would eventually bring equality between all nations and races.109 
The Jewish state, re-established in 1948 as the State of Israel, might be the only 
country in the world to have been at least partially inspired by science fiction 
novels. The utopian visions of an independent Jewish state were presented in a 
number of literary works, most of which appeared around the time of the hugely 
popular and influential utopian novel of the American author Edward Bellamy, 
Looking Backward: 2000–1887 (1888). These Jewish utopias were often 
structurally informed by Bellamy, but they also reflected on and reacted to 
European anti-Semitism and the pogroms in Russia. They present the future 
Jewish state as a model of virtues and idealism, with its society living 
harmoniously with the neighboring countries. Such imagined Jewish homelands 
are portrayed in, for example, Edmund Menachem Eisler’s Ein Zukunftsbild (“An 
Image of the Future,” 1885) and Max Austerberg-Verakoff’s Das Reich Judaea 
im Jahre 6000 (“The Kingdom of Judea in the Year 6000 [2241],” 1893). Both of 
these novels present a detailed description of the exodus of Jews from Europe, 
motivated by anti-Semitism, and the establishment of an independent Jewish state 
in Palestine with Hebrew as its official language. Henry Pereira Mendes’s 
Looking Ahead: Twentieth-Century Happenings (1899), written in broad terms 
and, as the title indicates, inspired by Bellamy’s Looking Backward, describes a 
newly formed Jewish homeland with Jerusalem as its capital, but fails to provide 
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the reader with any details about the society, government, or economy as most of 
the story is dedicated to the analysis of all the ills plaguing humanity. There are 
also utopias which depict the future Jewish state bearing the name Israel – Shenei 
Dimyonot (“Two Visions,” 1895) is a short story published in the Hebrew literary 
journal Sifrei Sha’ashu’im (“Books of Amusements”) by the Galician-born 
Hebrew author Isaac Fernhof and describes one reality as experienced by the 
narrator, a Jew who is kicked and humiliated on a train by a Polish fellow-
traveler, and another reality as the vision of an idyllic future State of Israel which 
the narrator creates so as to escape the present in his imagination. Reflecting the 
impact of the Balfour Declaration, Hillel Zeitlin’s In der Medinas Yisroel in Yor 
2000 (“In the State of Israel in the Year 2000,” 1919) is another utopia that refers 
to the imagined future Jewish state as the State of Israel. The founder of the 
Bezalel School in Jerusalem, Boris Shatz, also published a utopia named 
Yerushalayim ha-Benuyah (“Rebuilt Jerusalem,” 1924) in which a man is 
transported to the future Jewish state in 2018. Describing Jerusalem from above, 
the narrator sees the city as a biblical paradise ruled in an egalitarian and socialist 
spirit with economic wealth brought about by worker and art cooperatives and 
eco-friendly technological advances. The Jewish population co-exists 
harmoniously with the Arab citizens, who agreed to move the Dome of the Rock 
close to the Jaffa Gate, allowing the Jews to rebuild the Third Temple. Rather than 
becoming a place of religious worship, however, the Temple serves as a museum 
of Jewish art, culture, and science, thus reflecting the author’s understanding of art 
as a fundamental part of human existence.110 
Most of these works, however, failed to gain a larger readership or enthusiasm 
among the Zionists and are also often absent from the histories of Western utopian 
thought. The two key utopian works of fiction which succeeded in attracting wider 
and enthusiastic audiences within the Zionist movement, Elḥanan Leib 
Lewinsky’s Masa le-Ereẓ Yisrael bi-Shenat Tat be-Elef ha-Shishi (“A Trip to the 
Land of Israel in the Year 5800 [2040],” 1892) and Theodor Herzl’s Altneuland111 
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(“Old-New Land,” 1902), came to represent the cultural and political strains of 
Zionism, respectively. Lewinsky, an ardent Zionist active in Odessa and 
a supporter of Aḥad Ha-Am’s concept112 of the spiritual renaissance of Jewish 
people, emphasized the importance of the revival of Hebrew culture in the Land 
of Israel. His utopia, published in the first issue of the Hebrew periodical Pardes, 
was received favorably, especially among Herzl’s critics, who preferred 
Lewinsky’s stress on the renewal of Jewish culture.113 It tells the story of a newly 
wedded Jewish couple paying a visit in the year 2040 to the paradisiacal Land of 
Israel, which has become a spiritual and cultural center of the entire Jewish nation. 
The story offers a detailed description of life and cultural institutions as seen 
through the eyes of an admiring visitor who compares his experience with what he 
finds in the local newspapers and advertisements. The country is flourishing 
economically and while members of the modern and agrarian society own private 
property, mostly small farms, the accumulation of large property is not allowed, 
thus reducing exploitation and eradicating the struggle between labor and capital. 
The society is not religious, but the country’s law is based on a secularized 
version of traditional Jewish law. The political leaders are virtuous, have no will 
to power, and after having served their governmental roles return to their agrarian 
way of life. Although the state lives in peace with its neighbors, Lewinsky 
presents us with a purely Jewish utopia as the Arabs and gentiles are not 
mentioned as being part of the landscape and what happened to them remains 
unexplained.114 Indeed, Lewinsky follows Aḥad Ha’Am’s vision, which 
emphasizes far more the inner world of the Jews. Yitzhak Conforti therefore 
argues that “Lewinsky's approach faithfully represents the Eastern Jewish 
intellectuals who had limited exposure to Enlightenment; their perspective was 
first and foremost internally Jewish. Therefore, his vision, as opposed to Herzl's, 
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was particularistic and did not relate expansively to non-Jews or to the attempts of 
other nations to create a civilized society.”115 
However, the most famous and influential of Zionist utopias is Altneuland, 
written by the Austro-Hungarian Jewish journalist and founder of the World 
Zionist Organization Theodor Herzl, who drew inspiration from Theodor 
Hertzka’s successful utopian work Freiland: Eine soziales Zukunftsbild (1890; 
Freeland: A Social Anticipation, 1891). Hertzka was in turn seeking to emulate 
Bellamy’s proto-socialist Looking Backward, which earned him the title of the 
“Austrian Bellamy”.116 Altneuland, following the conventional structure of 
utopian novels, tells a story of two protagonists, Löwenberg and Kingscourt, who, 
disillusioned with their lives and society, decide to retire from the world and 
travel to a remote, uninhabited island. On their way to the blessed isle, the two 
visit Palestine and find it a land of desolation and poverty. In 1923, after spending 
some 20 years in solitude, the odd couple decide to visit Europe and again they 
stop en route in Palestine. To their amazement, they discover that the country has 
undergone a total transformation and the massive Jewish settlement has turned it 
into a land of milk and honey. The travelers set out on expeditions throughout the 
land and, with the help of a local guide, David Littwak, explore the structure of 
the utopian society – a New Society.117  
The country is a parliamentary democracy, without an army or armed police, 
respecting human rights and granting universal citizenship. Like Lewinsky’s 
imagined Jewish homeland, it is a welfare state, a synthesis of capitalism and 
socialism, based on the rule of law. However, Herzl does not speak of the 
country’s law and culture as explicitly Jewish, whereas in Lewinsky’s utopia the 
law and culture are derived from a secularized version of the Jewish tradition.118 
Despite the fact that Herzl describes the New Society as a modern, secularized, 
and highly technological enterprise, it shows numerous features which connect it 
with the Jewish religious tradition, such as the construction of the Third Temple 
(built in Jerusalem, but not in the place of mosques), an institution for communal 
prayer devoid of animal sacrifices. Herzl was also well aware of the sizeable Arab 
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population in the land and imagined that they would not only have true equality, 
but would fully participate in the social and political achievements of the new 
country. The fight for equal rights, for all citizens, including women and Arabs, is 
one of the major themes in the novel. A member of the New Society and a central 
figure in the novel, Reshid Bey, an Arab Muslim and a close friend of Littwak’s, 
also accompanies the two protagonists on their travels and when he is confronted 
by Kingscourt about whether he is concerned about Jewish immigration into his 
native land, he reacts with surprise, arguing that the immigrants only brought 
social, economic, and technological progress for the land and that all people 
benefit immensely from this. Another major character of the novel is Rabbi Dr. 
Geyer, a new immigrant who, in the elections of 1923, leads the political party 
which seeks to restrict citizenship and voting rights only to Jews. Part of the story 
revolves around the electoral campaign, in which the progressive and liberal 
establishment, represented by Littwak, opposes the racist challenges posed by 
Geyer and his followers. In the end however, Geyer and his political party are 
beaten and the liberals win. Herzl’s choice is therefore clear; the new Jewish state 
does not discriminate on the grounds of religion, race, or ethnicity.119 
In short, Herzl addressed three issues in his novel which are relevant even 
today in Israel’s public discourse: the social and economic structure of the society, 
the question of equality, and the relationship between state and religion. The 
Jewish society in Palestine and later in the State of Israel did indeed develop, to 
some degree, along the lines of Herzl’s vision and it is only in the past few 
decades that the welfare state has begun to disintegrate and social solidarity has 
been replaced by a highly competitive market economy resembling other Western 
market societies. Notwithstanding the fact that Altneuland is often reduced to a 
mere romantic fantasy, the novel continues to be pertinent even today through its 
interface between the literary imagination and historical reality.120 
Commemorating the 70th anniversary of the State of Israel, Roy Chen produced a 
musical comedy, Herzl said…, an adaptation of Altneuland, showing to what 
extent the present Israeli reality has departed from Herzl’s dream in the book.121 
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Ultimately, following the creation of the Jewish state, the novel and the utopian 
ideology of Zionism have become haunting ghosts of the past that hamper the 
ability of Israeli authors to produce notable works of science fiction and fantasy, 
because, as Elana Gomel points out, ‘science fiction, which needs the blank page 
of the future to write its narratives of unlimited technological progress, is 
discomfited by the tortuous temporality of Zionism, in which the ideal future lies 
in the past.’122 
5.1. Science Fiction and Utopia in Israeli Literature 
The post-1948 local realities set the narrative on a much darker and more dramatic 
path. Although utopian works are still being produced, the vision of the future of 
the State of Israel is more often translated into a darker dystopian and (post-) 
apocalyptic one, presenting us with a microcosm of the anxieties of Israeli society. 
Utopia, both as a political project and a literary genre, was particularly influential 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whereas dystopia, as is generally 
believed, has come to dominate the Western thinking about society in the second 
half of the twentieth century up until the present. It is said that the ability of the 
writer to produce classic utopias died in the twentieth century, extinguished by the 
horrors of total war, of genocide, and of totalitarianism.123 
The utopian ideals of the early Zionist thinkers started to erode in the 1950s, 
when the excitement from the War of Independence and the creation of the Jewish 
state gave way to the harsh realities of everyday life – nation-building, continuing 
conflict with the Arab nations, mass immigration, the shift of the foreign policy of 
the Soviet Union, and the necessity of compromising the ideals so that the new 
nation could survive militarily and economically.124 What seemed to be utopia 
realized became utopia lost soon after 1948, and the literary utopias have not 
found their place in Israel since. In addition to the general trend in the West, the 
absence of literary utopias in Israel can also be attributed today to 
multiculturalism and the growing number and significance of non-Zionist groups, 
such as Israeli-Arabs and ultra-orthodox Jews, which indicates that the Zionist 
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utopian imagination of the past can no longer be actualized without turning the 
dream into a zero-sum game. Today, the very nature of Israeli society presents an 
insurmountable obstacle for the Zionist dream and the only possible way to mold 
it into a utopian form is either by erasing the Israeli aspect of it or by 
incorporating fantasy elements to avoid the difficulty. Indeed, to imagine what an 
ideal Israeli society looks like would be difficult, if not outright impossible, as the 
‘unbridgeable gap between the secular and the ultra-Orthodox in Israel is not 
merely political but ontological. The same is largely true of the Arab and Russian 
communities. Their realities are profoundly different, and yet they all have to 
share the same small piece of real estate.’125 That is not to say that there is no 
hope for improvement, but the utopian change is by definition a significant one, 
which implies that any such change in the Hebrew literary imagination would turn 
either to a dystopia or to a non-Israeli utopia. General prosperity, technological 
advancement, and a lasting peace with the Arab world are probably the best 
scenario for a possible utopian vision, but the utopia as it was imagined by Herzl 
and many of his contemporaries is not feasible to achieve.126 
Israeli literature, from its very inception until very recently, has remained 
stubbornly realistic. The most prominent Israeli authors, such as Amos Oz, David 
Grossman, and A. B. Yehoshua, have perfected a mimetic literary style which 
strives to represent the complexities of everyday life.127 But why is it that a nation 
whose very existence was predicated upon imaginative fiction, has until recently, 
stigmatized the genre? Why did speculative literature not find any acceptance in 
the Hebrew world of belles lettres and why was realism, in an almost nineteenth-
century sense of the word, the dominant form of literary expression? And, more 
importantly, what can we learn about a culture which refuses to accept such a 
literary genre? The reasons for the aversion towards science fiction literature 
among cultural and literary critics, luminaries, and even the general public are 
complex and varied, with numerous explanations having been offered. First of all, 
the emphasis on the mimetic representation of reality was in part a result of the 
general tendency in Western culture, which regarded science fiction as being a 
disreputable literary form of inferior quality and, considering that cultural 
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influences tended to spread much more slowly in the Jewish state, these 
sentiments continued in the country well after the attitudes toward science fiction 
in the Anglo-American world became far more favorable.128 
Another explanation lies in the Zionist ideology of nation building – each 
individual was expected to contribute to the fulfillment of the Zionist dream to the 
best of their abilities and regardless of personal idiosyncrasies. One of the greatest 
achievements of Zionism, the new breed of Jew, the sabra – a strong, hard-
working, and idealistic individual – was represented in many works of fiction, 
most iconically in the character of Uri in the novel Hu Halakh ba-Sadot (“He 
Walked Through the Fields”) written by Moshe Shamir in 1947 and adapted for 
both theater and television. Following the establishment of the Jewish state, the 
writers were encouraged to produce works which were directly related to the 
building of a new nation and there was no place left for those who wished to write 
about imaginary worlds. Praising the establishment was desirable, criticizing it 
was also appreciated and even encouraged, but to deviate from these positions was 
not only frowned upon, it meant that no one would publish or read the work.129 
Even many of the pre-state Yishuv authors, already influenced by Russian 
literary realism, decided to distance themselves from the imaginary literature of 
the Jewish past and from the miracle-infused Hassidic lore. Since the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the Jewish community in the Yishuv had become 
increasingly oriented toward socialism, with the labor movement as the dominant 
force in politics. Socialist and Zionist ideology combined put a great emphasis on 
the role of intellectuals in the process of building a new society and culture, 
encouraging the artists, writers, and poets to render the utopian fantasy of a Jewish 
homeland in the most realistic and naturalistic terms possible. Considering the 
social pressures, the clear agendas of institutional publishers, and the aversion to 
the fantastic among the influential group of literary editors, critics, and scholars – 
all these elements effectively controlled the cultural output in the country. 
Unsurprisingly, speculative literature did not find any reputable publishers or 
widespread readership and it is absent both from the Hebrew literary canon and 
from what could be considered as popular fiction.130 
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Even with the rising popularity of speculative fiction worldwide, until very 
recently hard-core science fiction and fantasy literature lingered on the margins of 
Hebrew letters – perhaps this also has to do with the everyday Israeli reality, 
where imaginary realms might be seen as escapist. Israeli literature often concerns 
itself with the individual’s psychological response to the harsh realities of 
everyday life, whereas science fiction takes into consideration broader questions 
of social issues and the human condition in a changing world. The country still 
has to contend with many issues in the political and social realms, such as its own 
national borders, the rift between segmented parts of society, and its relationship 
with the neighboring Arab countries, the Palestinians, and with minority 
populations inside the country and so imaginary musings which go beyond the 
immediate future of everyday insecurities and conflicts are viewed by many as a 
luxury and distraction and are therefore dismissed.131 To illustrate further, 
speculative fiction was not the only ‘childish distraction’ for the nascent Israeli 
establishment – television was banned until as late as 1966 (and even after it was 
introduced, there were only two state-owned channels for the next twenty years), 
because the Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion considered it to be a ‘vulgar’ 
entertainment which would distract the minds of young Israelis.132 Much of Israeli 
science fiction and fantasy existed only in the form of translations and magazines 
and its ups and downs very much reflected the condition of the Israeli economy.133 
The appropriation and popularity of psychological realism in which authors 
aimed to portray the mundane, boring, and ordinary realities was equivalent to 
science fiction and the fantastic, because such reality proved elusive in a country 
with uncertain prospects and with normalcy becoming increasingly beyond 
people’s grasp. Elana Gomel, a scholar and author, observes similarly that the 
‘popularity of Amos Oz, David Grossman, A. B. Yehoshua, and others attests not 
only to their considerable literary talents but also to the hunger of the Israeli 
public for the ordinary and the commonplace… The Israeli “book of the world” is 
rattling with the rocks of its incessant wars and the shards of its broken dreams. In 
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such a consensus reality, one longs for the quotidian and escapes into boredom. 
Realism is the Israeli fantasy.’134 
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6. Hebrew Dystopian Literature 
6.1. Thematic Synopsis of Hebrew Dystopia 
Dystopian literature is an exception to the rule that until recently speculative 
fiction was regarded with contempt among most Israelis and as an example of 
cultural inauthenticity among cultural luminaries. Although it was not as highly 
popular as in Western culture, it managed to attract considerable interest and 
attention among Israeli readers and several works of Hebrew dystopian fiction 
have been translated into English and other languages worldwide. One of the first 
Hebrew literary works to incorporate tropes of the genre was a novella written by 
Israel’s respected and prolific author Amos Oz. Ahava Meuḥeret (1971; Late 
Love, 1975), while more psychological than cautionary, placed modern dystopian 
elements and imagery on the map of modern Hebrew literature. What enabled 
Israeli dystopian fiction to gain a measure of local acceptance was the fact that it 
provided a point of reference or some kind of a connection to the harsh realities of 
life. Despite the fact that these early works of speculative fiction were awash with 
science fiction and fantasy tropes, and can very well be qualified as works of 
science fiction, the authors vehemently rejected such assumptions. Amos Kenan, 
when interviewed about his dystopian political thriller The Road to Ein Harod, 
maintains that it is not a work of imaginative fiction, but rather a realistic 
portrayal of life in modern Israel. Not coincidentally, in the Orwellian year 1984 
several authors, including Benjamin Tammuz and Mishka Ben David, published 
their futuristic dystopian novels, but Kenan’s novel would eventually become one 
of the best received and most enduring examples of Israeli dystopias of the 
twentieth century.135 
This may come as no surprise, considering that in Israeli history the 1980s 
provided ample sources to spur the dystopian imagination. The most prominent 
event, the ill-conceived invasion of Lebanon in 1982, was a cause for much Israeli 
popular disillusionment, set off an international outcry and protest in Israel as 
well, and would eventually crush the expected results for years to come.136 The 
offensive was dubbed by the Israeli government Operation Peace for Galilee – a 
paradigm of the concept of Doublethink, which Orwell devised in his novel 
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Nineteen Eighty-Four.137 Terrorist attacks against Israelis and Jews in Europe, the 
emergence of the first suicide bombers, the unsuccessful plan of the then Defense 
Minister Ariel Sharon to transform the Middle East, and the constant sense of 
helplessness and vulnerability pervading Israeli society together with issues in the 
social realm such as privatization and the erosion of the welfare state and dramatic 
increases in consumerism and the standard of living138 would all provide fertile 
ground for dystopian visions. 
The ever-present anxiety that permeates the Israeli consciousness, as 
represented in many dystopian works, is the daunting prospect of the destruction 
of the Jewish nation-state by a foreign power, a threat which has become an 
integral part of the Israeli psyche. The nightmare visions of destruction from 
without are reflected in works such as Amos Kenan’s Shoah 2 (1975), David 
Yaron’s Ha-Pitriyah (1981), Mishka Ben David’s Ha-Beriḥah ha-Aḥaronah 
(1984), and others. Similarly, in Zeev Ben Yosef’s Shalom al Yisrael (1995) the 
reader is presented with a time when Israel is threatened by a Palestinian and neo-
Nazi plot. David Melamed’s Ha-Ḥalom ha-Revi’i (1986) is also an exemplary 
dystopia that relates to this theme, as it presents the destruction of the State of 
Israel by invading Arab armies, and then proceeds with a description of the exile 
of Israeli Jews back to Europe, especially to Poland and Germany.  
In other novels it is not the enemy from without that brings about Israel’s 
eventual downfall, but rather internal tensions. Kenan’s The Road to Ein Harod 
(1984) portrays Israel in the grip of civil war after a right-wing military putsch. 
Yehoshua Granot’s Pargod ha-Bedolaḥ (1969) likewise presents the future Israel 
as a totalitarian state persecuting Arab-Israelis and its other minorities.  
Another common theme involves a fundamentalist takeover by ultra-Orthodox 
Jews who are threatening the existence of secular Jews. Yitzhak Ben Ner’s 
Malakhim Ba’im (1987) follows the story of David Halperin, a secular man who 
had become part of a minority after the fanatical ultra-Orthodox takeover of the 
State of Israel turned it into an isolated and hated country with its citizens unable 
to leave and forced to live by religious norms. Other examples of these dystopias 
in shtreimels, so to speak, include Binyamin Tammuz’s Pundako shel Yirmiyahu 
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(1984), Assi Dayan’s Toḥen ha-Inyanim (1989), and others.139 Judaism is also 
presented in the dystopias of the last decade, but it is no longer marked so much 
with this secular-religious dichotomy (e.g., Hagai Dagan’s Ha-Areẓ Shatah, 
published in 2007, and Shimon Adaf’s Kefor, published in 2010) that is so 
characteristic of the dystopias of the 1980s.140 
 Another common denominator shared by many Hebrew dystopias is an 
environmental crisis. The growing preoccupation of Israeli society and culture 
with the environment has also manifested itself in literature. Ecological issues 
play a crucial and central role in some novels, while others combine national 
anxieties or internal social clashes among Israeli citizens with ecological dangers. 
The center of the dystopian reality in Roi Bet Levi’s Harim Ani Ro’eh (2014) is an 
economic crisis brought about by devastating and continuous droughts. Yishai 
Sarid’s Ha-Shlishi (2015) and Dror Burstein’s Tit (2016) are other ecocritical 
dystopias which have recently gained much popularity.141 
Finally, a generation later, following in the footsteps of Amos Kenan’s Ein 
Ḥarod, Sayed Kashua, a middle-class Arab-Israeli, published the dystopian 
thriller Va-Yehi Boker (2006), which reflects the author’s sense of the worsening 
situation of Israeli-Arabs and Palestinians within the majority Israeli-Jewish 
society. The protagonist of the story wakes up one day trapped in his hometown, 
surrounded all around by military forces which are ready to kill anyone trying to 
cross the lines. The novel concludes, to the protagonist’s horror, with a historic 
peace agreement between Israel and Palestine, including a land swap, with his 
village being transferred to the newly-established Palestinian territory. The work, 
being a part of the Israeli minority canon, presents a completely new and different 
perspective on the representation of Israeli reality through a dystopian prism. 
6.2.  From Bad to Worse: Hebrew Dystopian Fiction from 1969 
to 2000 
6.2.1.  The Source of Anxiety: Political and Social Transformation 
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“We were sure that Begin’s rise to power symbolizes the beginning 
of fascism in Israel and we were anxious and felt it was the end of 
the world.”142 
“For me, the fact that Likud took power is clear…there is a feeling 
that our world is about to be razed. The good old Land of Israel that 
we may be representing is going to hell.”143 
“This is the end of a period in the existence of Zionism. I have this 
feeling of devastation... We have lost the country... We are heading 
towards self-destruction.”144 
 
From the time of the Yishuv and well into statehood the labor movement, 
represented by the main party Mapai and from the 1965 by the ‘Alignment’,145 
controlled most of the ministries, the central institutions of the Zionist movement, 
the central federation of trade unions (Histadrut), and the press, publishing 
houses, radio and television channels, and other cultural enterprises. The 
movement also controlled the narrative about the Jewish people, the aims of 
Zionism, and the relationship between the state and the citizen. It held that a new 
healthy Jewish society was to be built in Israel as an antithesis to the Jewish 
existence in exile. The new Jew, or sabra, could do no better than to devote his 
life to building, defending, and developing the new country that was to uphold 
secular and democratic ideals closely linked to Western culture and society. These 
ideas were already internalized by the Jewish society during the time of the British 
Mandate as most of the immigrants at that point were from Eastern and Central 
Europe. After the creation of the state, this part of society would become the 
bearers of the hegemonic culture. The hegemony of the labor movement ended in 
1977 when the right-wing Likud party, led by Menachem Begin, won the 
elections and remained the ruling party for some 45 years, apart from short break 
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in the 1990s.146 At the time the results were dubbed “an earthquake”, because not 
only did the Labor Party lose in the elections for the first time, but the loss was by 
a wide margin. There were a number of reasons for this outcome, including the 
public’s mistrust of the government and the Knesset for their inability to tackle the 
country’s problems successfully, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the hyperinflation 
which started in the 1970s and continued into the mid-1980s, and the rift between 
the Ashkenazi and Mizrahi populations and between the secular and religious 
groups.147 
The political and cultural decline of the labor movement which started at the 
end of the 1970s marked a significant turning point in the historical process of the 
State of Israel. The changes that unfolded at this time in Israeli politics, culture, 
and society were far-reaching. The visions of the country’s future would thereafter 
be shaped by the Jewish religious groups and Jewish secular liberals. The 
hegemonic domination of the labor movement was replaced in the following 
decades by a sharp cultural and political polarization that would later be 
conceptualized as multiculturalism. Discussing changes in the Israeli Supreme 
court and its involvement in the cultural struggle (an involvement that reflected its 
association with the Jewish liberal segment of the society),148 Israeli law professor 
Menachem Mautner argues that after the labor movement’s decline and the 
ensuing struggle over the character of the country, “members of the Jewish secular 
liberal group were struck by anxiety” and that this anxiety “dictated the group’s 
political conduct during the 1980s […].”149 
Israel has undergone, in a very brief course of time, a significant 
transformation of its cultural identity. The faith in socialism and the state’s 
profound involvement in the economy transitioned to a faith in American-style 
hypercapitalism, neoliberalism, and the free market; the collectivist values of 
sacrifice and contribution gave way to the hedonistic existence of self-realization 
and to the rights and independence of the individual; and the perception of Israelis 
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themselves as Hebrews, turning away from their exilic cultural heritage, changed 
to seeking a better understanding of that very Jewish exilic culture.150 
The political struggle between Right and Left was accompanied by two more 
significant processes: the rising tensions between the Mizraḥi and Ashkenazi Jews 
and the rift between the religious and secular parts of the society. The labor 
movement was in complete control of the cultural life in the country up until the 
1970s and most Jews living in Israel accepted its principles. When the labor 
movement and its hegemonic culture began to decline, it created a sense of 
disintegration of the previous common national frame and the new form of society 
began to be torn by social divisions between various groups which were separated 
by their lifestyles and world views. Indeed, sociologist Baruch Kimmerling claims 
that the most drastic changes the State of Israel has undergone were “the 
evaporation of the image of a single, unified Israeli society, the decline of a 
unique Israeli identity (notwithstanding excluded and marginal groups, such as the 
Arabs and Orthodox Jews), and the diminishment of hegemonic secular Hebrew 
culture.”151 Consequently, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Israeli society split 
into several sub-groups, each of them developing its own cultural features, 
identity, and understanding of the socio-historical processes of the country. These 
groups then also developed their distinct visions regarding the future of the State 
of Israel. In Kimmerling’s account, seven cultures or social groups emerged after 
the decline of the original Zionist hegemony that maintain their own separate 
collective identities and are in constant cultural war against each other: “the 
previously hegemonic secular Ashkenazi upper middle class, the national 
religious, the traditionalist Mizrahim (Orientals), the Orthodox religious, the 
Arabs, the new Russian immigrants, and the Ethiopians.”152 All this social and 
cultural plurality led to the emergence of a new multicultural interpretation of 
Israeli culture, which superseded the old ideology of the “melting pot” of previous 
decades.153 However, lacking a unifying core, plurality has been replaced by 
fragmentation, polarization, and antagonism and the Israeli society has become a 
society filled with anxieties over these sentiments. This then poses something of a 
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paradox: Israel recognizes its cultural, ethnic, and religious plurality through 
many multicultural processes, such as language rights, separate education 
systems, independent religious courts, etc., but at the same time all this 
recognition is ineffective in the face of the actual co-existence of diversity. 
President Reuven Rivlin pointed this out in the following speech he delivered to 
the Israel Knesset in 2016: “Every day I meet citizens from different sectors 
within Israeli society. Religious, orthodox, secular, Arabs. There is much that 
separates them. However, I am continually surprised to discover that they share a 
common sentiment. All of them, with no exception, think of themselves as a 
persecuted minority, whose identity and values are subject to constant threat from 
other groups.”154 
It is also worthy of note that the multiculturalization of Israel was one of the 
aspects of the extensive process of Americanization and globalization that Israel 
has undergone, through cultural borrowing, since the 1960 and which culminated 
in the 1990s, particularly in the spheres of the economy, law, and the media. This 
has led the Western culture in Israel to become synonymous with American 
culture rather than European culture. Additionally, the process of Americanization 
was also associated with the neo-liberalization of the economy, the inflow of 
global culture, a consumer lifestyle, postmodern culture, and in general with the 
transformation of the social composition and its dynamics.155 
As mentioned earlier, the transformation of cultural uniformity and the supra-
culture to multiculturalism was accompanied by another significant process – the 
emergence of an old-new, and until then politically marginalized, social and 
political entity that became to be perceived as a comprehensive alternative to the 
declining hegemony. The struggle over the shaping of Israeli culture was again 
between the liberal secular former leadership and the religious Zionists who 
believed the country should follow the traditional religious laws. Both of these 
groups had contrasting views on the future character of the state. Simultaneously 
with the labor movement’s decline in the 1970s, the religious Zionist group 
 
154 Rebecca B. Kook, ‘Multiculturalism and Identity Politics’, in Understanding Israel: Political, 
Societal and Security Challenges, ed. by Joel Peters and Rob Geist Pinfold (Routledge, 2019), p. 
120; see also ibid., pp. 119–132. 
155 See Uzi Rebhun and Chaim I. Waxman, ‘The "Americanization" of Israel: A Demographic, 
Cultural and Political Evaluation’, Israel Studies, 5:1 (Spring 2000), pp. 65–91; see also Uri Ram, 
‘Sociopolitical Cleavages in Israel’, in The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society, ed. by 
Reuven Y. Hazan, Alan Dowty, Menachem Hofnung, and Gideon Rahat (Oxford University Press, 
2021), pp. 123–140. 
61 
 
underwent some radical changes instigated by the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the 
Faithful) movement, which led the group to adopt fundamentalist theology and 
practices. Since the group’s future vision of Israel became synonymous with a 
halakhic state, they no longer saw themselves as political partners within the 
hegemony, but rather as potential leaders of a new government that might evolve 
in the future. Indeed, the settlement endeavors of Gush Emunim in the occupied 
territories are often viewed as a foundation for turning the whole country into a 
halakhic state.156 Amos Oz, representing the secular liberal group, comments on 
these new trends within religious Zionism during his meeting with settlers from 
Ofrah in 1982:157 “When we look at you from a distance, maybe a little sketchily, 
we see in you a dangerous threat to what is dear and sacred to us. Here the dispute 
reaches higher than the highest of Samaria's mountains and drops much lower 
than the lowest point in the Jordan Valley rift: you threaten to boot Israel out of 
the union between Jewish tradition and Western humanism. As far as I am 
concerned, you threaten to push Judaism back through history, back to the Book 
of Joshua, to the days of the Judges, to the extreme of fanatical tribalism, brutal 
and closed.”158 Despite the opposition, the settlement movement has become one 
of the most influential political and social movements in the state’s history and 
has been able to make its way into the political system, society, and the army, and 
it has been on a steady rise regardless of Israel’s coalitions and policies.159 
Besides the religious Zionists, the Jewish religious group includes another 
subgroup that has taken part in the government coalitions since the 1980s. The 
ultra-Orthodox [Haredim], both Ashkenazi and Sephardic, is the second largest 
subgroup of the religious political movement. The Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox 
behavior and stance towards modernity, Zionism, and the State of Israel remained, 
for the most part, consistent and can be understood on the basis of their positions 
on the Jewish Enlightenment movement and on the secular progressive attitudes in 
general, which they rejected and countered with stricter segregation and greater 
religious commitment. Although the ultra-Orthodox rejected the intellectual and 
cultural heritage of the West, they have never really objected to the consumption 
of Western technology. The group also rejects Zionism because it actively seeks 
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to interfere in the shaping of the Jewish people’s destiny by promoting re-
establishment and support for a Jewish state before the arrival of the Messiah, and 
so for them the establishment of Israel was not a significant moment in Jewish 
history. The majority of Haredim recognize the State of Israel and its law mostly 
on pragmatic grounds without any ideological identification with it and the only 
laws that the group truly recognizes are the divine halakhic laws. Hence their 
rejection of the religious Zionist vision of transforming Israel into a halakhic 
state.160 
For most of the time when the labor movement dominated the political scene, 
the ultra-Orthodox, like Israeli Arabs, did not participate in the government 
coalitions. After the political upheaval of 1977, the Ashkenazi Haredim party 
Agudat Israel161 joined the government coalition for the first time since 1952. Its 
support became, from then on, valuable for securing a coalition majority, and 
therefore it often exerts more leverage than its size would suggest. The party’s 
involvement in the political arena and its allocation of funds to ultra-Orthodox 
educational institutions have grown enormously since 1977. Although historically 
anti-Zionists, the ultra-Orthodox mostly shifted to a non-Zionist stance and as 
they joined the government coalitions, they became increasingly involved in 
political decisions which are far beyond their sectorial interests, thus showing 
their readiness to shape the character of Israeli society according to their vision.162 
The Sephardic ultra-Orthodox entered the national political arena 
independently and became an electoral force only in the early 1980s, when the 
religious-political movement Shas emerged as a party after Agudat Israel refused 
to add more Sephardic candidates to its list. The party repeated its electoral 
success in the subsequent elections and in 1999 it became the largest religious 
party and the third largest party in the Knesset with seventeen seats, making it a 
powerful voice in Israeli politics. Shas, however, presented a different kind of 
ultra-Orthodoxy than the Ashkenazi version. It did not enter Israeli politics only to 
promote the Jewish religious legislation, like the Ashkenazi Haredim parties, but 
it also had interests in implementing radical changes in the social sphere and 
improving the social condition of Mizrahi citizens. Combining the ultra-Orthodox 
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religion with ethnic pride, Shas voters often identified with its social and oriental 
identity message. The party therefore had some success in attracting support from 
secular Mizraḥi voters, even though it promoted a religious anti-secular Jewish 
identity. Indeed, Shas does not promote social or geographical segregation from 
the rest of the society and it speaks to the entire public, not just the Mizraḥi ultra-
Orthodox segment. Moreover, unlike the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox, the group 
espouses Zionism and views the establishment of the Jewish state as a positive 
event playing an important role in the future redemption of the Jewish people. In 
this regard, Shas is ideologically closer to the religious Zionists, voicing its 
support for the replacement of Israeli democracy with a Sephardic version of a 
theocratic state.163 
The significant transformation of the political composition of the Israeli 
government that started in the 1980s changed the balance of power in the religious 
camp: before the Shas party entered politics, most of the religious public was 
represented by the National Religious Party (NRP) – originally a Zionist centrist 
party closely linked to the secular mainstream and from 1970s drifting more to the 
right and associating itself with the Gush Emunim movement. Since the decline of 
the NRP in the 1970s and the emergence of Shas, the Jewish religious group has 
been represented overwhelmingly by ultra-Orthodox parties that are detached 
from the secular Israeli mainstream. Moreover, after the 1980s, when Israeli 
politics became split between two closely balanced political blocs, the ultra-
Orthodox group as a whole gained the power to decide which of the two would 
get to form a government coalition. That way the ultra-Orthodox parties were 
often able to impose on the ruling majority the regulations and legislation 
desirable to them.164 
We will now focus on the fictional worlds in which the imagined implications 
of all these social, political, and ideological processes are brought to a bleak and 
depressing future. 
6.2.2. National Catastrophe Looms 
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The fundamental changes in reality that have been unfolding from the 1970s 
onwards have been accompanied by changes in culture. The cultural texts of the 
1970s and especially of the 1980s were starting to reflect the frustration and deep 
anxiety among the Jewish liberal group, which became increasingly disillusioned 
with the direction the country was headed in. It was not only the internal anxieties 
that were being channeled through the works of fiction; they were being equally 
reinforced by the old external anxieties that the Israelis have been dealing with 
since the creation of the state. These external anxieties stemmed from Israel’s 
relations with the Arab world. Starting with the Zionist settlement in Palestine and 
during the whole existence of the State of Israel, the Jews have been facing 
existential anxiety about the possibility of their expulsion or their physical 
destruction by invading Arab armies. The profound internal changes in Israeli 
politics and culture, combined with the anxiety about the destruction of Israel by 
external forces, eventually gave birth to the first wave of Israeli dystopian 
literature.165  
The Israeli dystopias of this period primarily explore two themes: the issue of 
religion and the issue of conflict, both of which, however, often overlap. The 
conflict, resulting in the destruction of the country, is portrayed either as 
stemming from the oppression of Israeli-Arabs and other minorities by the Israeli 
regime and its increasing militarism and political repression (“dystopias on the 
left”) or as a result of the peacemaking process with the Arab countries and their 
future invasion (“dystopias on the right”). The religious dystopias examine the 
problem of either continuity or a deep division between the Jewish identity and 
Israeli identity, and therefore can be divided into ultra-Orthodox dystopias and 
ultranationalist religious dystopias. The divisions in the texts themselves exist to 
indicate which of the two groups is responsible for the destruction of the country: 
the settlement movement, with its messianic and theocratic ideology, or the ultra-
Orthodox group, with its religious fundamentalism. Both of these types of 
dystopias, however, have a common denominator: the seizure of power over the 
country, followed by the abolition of democracy and individual freedoms.166 
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Paradoxically, the beginnings of literary depictions of Israel’s destruction by 
external forces in the Hebrew prose came shortly after the swift victory that ended 
1967’s Six-Day War. The first work to put dystopia squarely on the map of 
Modern Hebrew literature, Pargod ha-Bedolaḥ (“The Crystal Screen”), was 
written in 1969 by a little-known author and journalist, Yehoshua Granot, who 
published only a handful of works during his lifetime. The novel recounts the 
future events happening in 1989 in the State of Israel, which has become a 
totalitarian police state that limits the freedom of expression and has deprived the 
Arab minority of all of their rights as citizens. The work gave rise to heated 
debates among literary scholars and critics, with one of the most outspoken, the 
Israeli public figure and Jewish thinker Yeshayahu Leibowitz, writing to Granot: 
“You are mistaken about one crucial point: if the State of Israel turns into 
“Greater Israel” it will not continue to exist until 1989.”167 Granot’s future 
fictional Israel of 1989 is governed by three major political parties which came to 
power after a number of measures were taken to restrict the elections, including 
the raising of the electoral threshold and the blocking of the creation of new 
political parties. Although Israel also has to cope with pressures from the Soviet 
bloc and the United States, together with a constant threat to its existence at the 
hands of Arab nations, it succeeds in surviving by demonstrating its nuclear 
capabilities. The protagonist of the story, Yair Ronen, works for the National 
Security Agency, whose objective is to suppress any Jewish subversion. Yair is 
confronted by a number of groups similar to those that the political establishment 
during the labor hegemony had to contend with: communists who support the 
establishment of a worldwide stateless communist society, communists who want 
to become a part of the Soviet bloc, and also liberal groups advocating the two-
state solution.168 
 The novel, a political dystopia, also incorporates the use of technology in a 
way that assists the regime’s exercise of power, such as projectiles that cause an 
electric shock upon contact with their targets, temperature-adapting synthetic 
clothing, nearly silent vehicles, and bliss-inducing drugs that also improve 
physical fitness. The impact of science and technology and the idea of a 
totalitarian dictatorship are defining characteristics of the dystopian genre. 
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Elements such as wonder drugs and pills evoke the mood-enhancing drug soma 
from Huxley’s Brave New World, while the underground conspiracies, secret 
services, and the overt use of force to suppress opposition call to mind the 
totalitarian regime of Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.169 
The prominent author, intellectual, and peace activist Amos Oz also reflected 
at this time on the growing anxieties over both external threats and internal issues 
in his story Late Love. The unappealing narrator Shraga Unger, an aged lecturer 
and cultural worker in poor health and with his breath reeking of decay, decides to 
travel all across the country to warn of the impending doom at the hands of the 
Soviet Russians and the Arab nations supported by them, who want to massacre 
the whole Jewish nation and are planning mass executions all over the world, 
including Tel Aviv, Ukraine, the Asiatic Republics, and Moscow itself. Unger is 
obsessed with a delusional conspiracy theory that Soviet Russia is plotting against 
the entire world, and against the Jews in particular. He is convinced that there are 
enemy secret agents in every corner of the country, including his workplace, and 
that the Bolsheviks’ plan to exterminate the Jewish people is a first step toward 
bringing the world into a state of turmoil. Many parts of Unger’s monologue seem 
to convey that the long-standing anti-Semitism of Russia has followed the Jews to 
their ancestral homeland, provides armaments for their enemies, and is as 
unstoppable as a “heavy Russian winter snowstorm” which “could wipe Tel Aviv 
completely off the face of the earth.”170 However, Unger’s old friend and former 
colleague Liuba, who is a member of the Working Women's Council on the 
Commission for Clean Air, believes that the internal corruption and decay of the 
Zionist ideals is a more immediate and dangerous threat for the Jews. She insists 
that the dreams and ideals of the early Jewish pioneers are all dead and she 
continues to talk about the environmental degradation and aggravated pollution in 
Tel Aviv, which seemingly symbolize the decay of those ideals.  
During Unger’s visit to Liuba’s home, she speaks at length about the 
destruction of the ecosystem, about food pollution, and how the fruits and 
vegetables are contaminated with poisonous chemicals. She then continues to talk 
about the air and water pollution. The drinking water is contaminated by toxic 
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pollutants and the air is full of exhaust gases – all this results in water shortages 
and the constant presence of thick smoke in Tel Aviv. The local flora and fauna 
are also affected by the pollution, and the trees all over the city are dying. The city 
of Tel Aviv, which was built upon the Zionist ideals, is slowly decomposing and 
the danger of disaster and collapse always looms large on the horizon. The 
imagery of urban decay and the imminent destruction of Israel has parallels in the 
physical deterioration of Unger’s own body. The parallel and shared deterioration 
of both the body and its surroundings is an element which becomes common in 
the subsequent Hebrew works of fiction.171 The novel is also an exception to the 
general presumption that the Israeli dystopias of this period hardly ever discuss or 
include environmental themes or ecological disasters, whether as a source of the 
catastrophe or as a symbol of moral decay – a theme that becomes much more 
prevalent in Hebrew dystopian fiction of the twenty-first century.172 
Amos Kenan (1927-2009), a prominent left-wing novelist, dramatist, and an 
outspoken critic of Israeli policies, wrote two powerful dystopian novels, one of 
which became an Israeli best-seller and was translated into a number of languages. 
In his youth, Kenan was active in the socialist-Zionist movement Ha-Shomer ha-
Ẓair and later became a member of the right-wing Leḥi underground militia. 
Kenan fought with the Leḥi in the 1948 War and participated in the attack on the 
village of Deir Yassin, whose inhabitants were massacred. Subsequently, he 
became a leading left-wing journalist and an early advocate of the two-state 
solution, but he also directed films and wrote plays.173 In 1975 Kenan published a 
novel named Shoah II, a military-based dystopia set in a refugee camp after the 
destruction of Israel, which combines both national-political and existential 
themes. The description of daily life in the camp is portrayed in grotesque, even 
satirical terms – every day a person is executed, but no one knows who the next 
victim will be and those who are found to be affected by leprosy are sent to a 
closed colony, where the diseased are left to eat each other. The existential 
situation is explained in political terms – a national holocaust. The protagonist has 
no hope for better days and his past recollections become distant, vague, and 
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mixed-up. As he repeatedly tries to remember the scenery of the past, like the 
beautiful Tel Aviv or beaches of fine golden sand, he is left with memories of 
death and destruction, of Jews who fell during the siege of Massada, of the 
Spanish Inquisition and Expulsion. Here the fate and death of an individual 
represent the destruction of the whole Jewish nation. It is not only temporalities 
that are confounded; the space is equally stretched to desolation – pine forests and 
blue skies lead to visions of Nazi death camps and dreams of distant safe places 
become thoughts of Massada. Similarly, both realistic and miraculous dreams of 
redemption turn into dreams of fear and destruction. The novel thus creates a 
world of existential dread, a world devoid of hopes and dreams and of space and 
time. This existential dread, however, is not rooted in the universal human 
condition, but in a specific Israeli-Jewish background. Kenan thus explores the 
Israeli and Jewish past, disillusionment about hopes and dreams that were never 
truly realized, and the constant anxiety about possible pogroms and a repetition of 
the Holocaust, as well as the harsh reality of the ever-imminent war, which 
follows the protagonist even to his place of refuge – to his heterotopia.174 
Almost a decade later Kenan crafted Israeli literature’s most famous dystopian 
novel, Ha-Derekh le-Ein Harod (1984; The Road to Ein Harod, 1988). Although 
Kenan does not mention the Lebanon War in the novel, the grim and violent tone 
of the story can be read as a response to it. In this Orwellian novel, Israel is 
portrayed in the grip of a civil war following a right-wing military coup, with 
army patrols bloodily suppressing any kind of domestic liberal opposition, hunting 
down the remaining Arab population, most of which has been expelled to 
neighboring countries, and bringing the country to the brink of nuclear war. Rafi, 
Kenan’s sardonic protagonist and narrator, living in Tel Aviv, rebels against the 
militarized police state, and despite the ban on travel and military forces shooting 
any traveler on sight, he sets out on a perilous journey across the hostile country 
after hearing antigovernment radio broadcasts from the last stronghold of the 
rebellion – the kibbutz of Ein Harod – an early kibbutz that the book takes its 
name from and also a powerful symbol of Israel’s utopian aspirations. On his way, 
he is first aided briefly by a married Jewish woman who seduces him, but a stray 
bullet kills her in the middle of a sex act. The hero, a former soldier who – just 
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like the author – used to drive the Palestinians out of their villages, must now 
team up with Mahmoud, an Arab insurgent, to guide him across the country to Ein 
Harod. Mahmoud, a hunted man filled with resentment against the Jews, is bound 
for an unspecified place somewhere beyond Ein Harod. The Holocaust imagery is 
evoked when the two fugitives witness the mass shooting of dissidents whose 
bodies are afterwards thrown into an open pit. As in Oz’s Late Love, the memory 
of the persecution and mass murder of Jews by the Nazis is here projected into a 
catastrophic future war against Arabs and internal enemies. The apocalyptic theme 
becomes explicit when Rafi and Mahmoud pass through Har Megiddo – from 
which the Greek word Armageddon is derived – and make their way to “Free Ein 
Harod”. The narrative takes a surreal turn when the protagonist is taken prisoner 
inside an underground bunker by a revenge-obsessed military general who plans 
to fight a retroactive war and launches missiles back through time to destroy the 
historical enemies of the Jews – from Nebuchadnezzar and Titus to the Ukrainian 
leader of the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky. When Rafi finally emerges from the bunker 
and reaches the Ein Harod kibbutz in the Jezreel Valley (in the past the site of 
Arab villages) he sees only a landscape untouched by humans – a pastoral scene 
from the times of biblical Israel. Seemingly, Kenan searches for the utopia in the 
past and suggests the world needs to be destroyed in order to be saved. Here, the 
dystopian warnings about the future, based on the combination of the present 
reality and the things we know about history, are a clear expression of anxiety on 
the side of the secular Ashkenazi leadership.175 
As in Kenan’s Shoah II, the existential crisis triggered by external threats 
reappears shortly afterwards in Ha-Pitriyah 1988 (“The Mushroom 1988,” 1981), 
by the little-known author David Yaron, and later in Ha-Beriḥah ha-Aḥaronah 
(“The Last Escape,” 1984) by Mishka Ben David. In Ha-Pitriyah 1988 a nuclear 
attack on Israel by Arab countries and its escape from this perilous predicament 
dominate the story. The narrative of Yaron’s novel revolves around a nefarious 
plot by the Iraqis to drop an atomic bomb on Israel in 1988, Israel’s 40th 
anniversary. This attempt is foiled by the protagonists of the story, members of 
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Israel’s Mossad espionage agency, who succeed in diverting the nuclear missile 
slightly so that it hits the Palestinian state instead of Israel. The State of Palestine 
did not exist when Yaron wrote his novel, but would declare its independence in 
1988, the year in which the story is set. The novel concludes with the nuclear 
strike without elaborating on the effects it has on Israel and its population, and 
although Yaron later published a sequel, in which he describes similar events of 
Libyans attempting to erase Egypt from the map, there is no reference to the 
consequences of dropping a nuclear bomb near Israel’s border. The nuclear threat 
was, at the time when the novel was published, a very plausible dystopian 
scenario and the Israeli fear eventually culminated in a surprise preventive 
airstrike, in 1981, by the Israeli Air Force, which destroyed an unfinished nuclear 
facility in Iraq.176 
While its central focus is antisemitism and crime waves against Jews in the 
United States, in 1985, Mishka Ben David’s Ha-Beriḥah ha-Aḥaronah also 
includes the theme of war in the Middle East. The armies of the surrounding Arab 
countries invade Israel and the crippling oil embargo against Israel’s allies causes 
Washington to change sides and support the Arabs. In response, Israel’s defense 
forces attack Saudi Arabia’s key oil installations using bombs and shoot down an 
American reconnaissance jet. After these events, Israel is expelled from the 
United Nations and the US breaks off all diplomatic relations with it. American 
Jewry is helpless and torn between its strong bond to the Jewish State and its 
loyalty to the US government. The conflict is followed by an unprecedented wave 
of antisemitism – Jews begin to be excluded from society and from their 
employment. Ben David’s dystopian projection and the dramatic developments in 
the novel are seemingly motivated by the traumatic events of the Yom Kippur 
War, when the Arab oil producers attempted to use oil as leverage to prevent 
nations from supporting Israel during the war.177 
As discussed earlier, one of the facets of the cultural struggle taking place in 
Israel from the late 1970s was the religious-secular dichotomy. The disruption of 
social cohesiveness, in part as a result of religious extremism, and the impression 
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of the Ashkenazi liberal group that their secular culture was being defeated by 
religious orthodoxy, were also reflected in the literary texts. When the Shas party 
gained a number of Knesset seats for the first time in the 1984 elections, it entered 
the consciousness of secular liberal Jews in Israel as something alien and 
threatening. The secular media reported on plans to limit the secular freedoms 
after the party was given the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior in Israel’s 
new coalition government. The emergence of religious dystopias at this time can 
also be linked to the sudden upsurge of renewed interest in returning to Orthodox 
religious tradition following the Yom Kippur War – among the well-known liberal 
figures from the world of entertainment who became religious was a famous 
filmmaker, Uri Zohar. The secular press and leading secular personalities 
regarded these processes as representing a return to the dark days of medieval 
fanaticism and religious fundamentalism.178 
In 1984, Benjamin Tammuz, another leading Israeli writer and journalist, 
published his grotesque anti-utopian dystopia Pundako shel Yirmiyahu 
(“Jeremiah’s Inn”). The protagonist of the story, Jeremiah Abramson, works at the 
beginning in a factory developing destructive futuristic weapons which can target 
a specific group of people on the basis of their nationality or other characteristics. 
The selective weapon is the only export product of the city-state of Jerusalem.  
Jeremiah outwardly pretends to be an ultra-Orthodox person, but secretly lives as 
a secular rapist. Gomer, Jeremiah’s sister, is a divorced nymphomaniac who 
sleeps with anyone she can, in order to become pregnant, and only rejects a 
certain Buki Trantz, who tries to get her at all costs. Buki works as a spy for the 
ultra-Orthodox authorities, who suspect that Jeremiah is a secular person 
disguised as an ultra-Orthodox Jew. To find a safer position, Jeremiah leaves the 
bastion city of Jerusalem and moves to a place at the edge of a desert, father away 
from the authorities, where he sets up a roadside inn. The inn mostly 
accommodates people immigrating to Jerusalem and the ultra-Orthodox security 
services spy on the new immigrants both to find out locations within the city 
where the secular Jews are hiding and to prevent the disruption of the balance 
between the separate religious groups in the city that are constantly fighting one 
another. 
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 The futuristic novel imagines Israel in the closing decades of the twenty-first 
century, by which time it has long turned into a theocracy ruled by a Sanhedrin. 
The country’s population, mostly made up of several religious groups, resides in 
three separate strongholds: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Nahariya. The vast majority 
of Israel’s secular population has fled the country, and those remaining are 
persecuted by the secret services of the strongholds. To avoid persecution, these 
secular Jews conceal their identity and present themselves as living strictly 
according to the religious laws, though they practice their non-belief clandestinely 
in the city’s underground and occasionally perpetrate terrorist attacks on the ultra-
Orthodox institutions. The author also provides a background to his story by 
describing the history of Israel and the changes it underwent a century earlier, at 
the beginning of the 1980s. After gaining the power to tip the scales in the 
political stalemate, the ultra-Orthodox parties formed an alliance with ultra-
nationalist groups and gradually converted Israel from a Zionist state into a 
theocracy.179 
In his work Tammuz draws attention to the issue of religious coercion and 
provides a detailed description of extreme social violence. The violence is 
perpetrated by the governing ultra-Orthodox leadership against the remaining 
secular, Arab, and Christian inhabitants, either out of private interests or out of the 
desire to impose the religious laws. The author’s criticism focuses on the irrational 
manifestations of hatred and violence of religious groups against secular people 
and among themselves, and on the problem of corruption and immorality within 
the religious community. The novel thus hints at what the author, and in general 
the secular liberal group, thought might happen to Israel in the future. It is an open 
and blatant expression of deep-rooted anxiety about the possible takeover of the 
country by religious zealots. Tammuz later sought to emphasize that his work is 
not an attack on religion as such, but rather a criticism of the authoritarian, 
populist, and violent behavior of the religious leadership, who see religion as a 
useful tool for gaining power.180 
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Religion also comes to the fore in Yitzhak Ben-Ner’s Malakhim Ba’im (“The 
Angels are Coming,” 1987), which is on the border of dystopia, fantasy fiction, 
and crime fiction. The novel is centered around the character of David Halperin, a 
snobbish secular computer expert from Tel Aviv, who experiences a miraculous 
healing after being beaten to the brink of death by a group of religious thugs. 
Halperin, accompanied by two imaginary dwarves and briefly aided by a 
mysterious policewoman, Dolly, then sets out on a journey of self-discovery and 
revenge – he leaves his friends and family in Tel Aviv, moves to orthodox 
Jerusalem, and, disguised as a computer technician in a small printing house, 
pursues his enemies.  
Set in the mid-twenty-first century, Malakhim Ba’im presents a world which 
has been radically altered by an unspecified global disaster. Miraculously, Israel is 
the only country which has not been affected by the disaster, and yet the character 
of the state has changed radically – it is no longer threatened by the fragile 
economy and by the Arab inhabitants, most of whom have been expelled or 
imprisoned, and the trade in scientific knowledge has transformed it into a 
technologically advanced and wealthy country. These are, however, marginal 
aspects of the novel’s main plot as well as of its key themes – religious 
fundamentalism, brutal totalitarianism, and a diminishing and self-doubting 
secular minority which has lost its sense of national identity. Ben-Ner’s fictional 
State of Israel, hated and isolated, is ruled by national religious fanatics and the 
waning minority of secularists is forced into passivity and compliance. The 
country’s dissidents are heavily oppressed and the citizens are forced to adhere to 
strict religious norms, including a ban on smoking, abortion, blasphemy, 
homosexuality, and indecency. The secular and religious inhabitants have 
virtually nothing in common. The secular minority, regarded as inferior and weak, 
lives mostly in Tel Aviv, and uses Angrit, a combination of the Hebrew and 
English languages. The secular inferiority is expressed in the imagery of defeat 
and humiliation in the face of the strength of the religious camp, which is 
represented as an ancient but also fossilized entity with its unchanging customs, 
prayers, and clothing – a world over which the secular person has no influence, 
and a religion in which he has no share.181 
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At the start of the novel Halperin is portrayed as a conformist and his 
existential stance is one of passive survival. Indeed, the weakness and inferiority 
of the secularists is portrayed not only as a result of oppression by the theocratic 
state, but also by their own acquiescence and conformity to the authoritarian 
regime of the country. The turning point of the typical dystopian awakening 
comes only when the hero is physically assaulted by a trio of ultra-Orthodox 
militants, which sets him off on a quest for futile vengeance against those who 
inflicted pain on him. To hunt down his oppressors, Halperin turns from an 
indifferent conformist into a ruthless avenger, and although at some point he 
triumphs over his enemies, his apparent victory only leads to utter defeat as his 
oppressors retaliate against him and against everyone close to him. This leads 
Halperin to succumb to despair and, at the end, to death. 
Malakhim Ba’im is a satirical projection of the author’s fears into the future 
and the narrative continuously oscillates between realism and fantasy, comedy and 
parody, and social satire and individual anxiety. Although there are elements of 
the fantastic, the novel is clearly dystopian as the details of the futuristic story are 
portrayed realistically with a distinct didactic, cautionary, and ultimately political 
orientation.182 
The themes of religion and war also feature in David Melamed’s Ha-Ḥalom 
ha-Revi’i (“The Fourth Dream,” 1986). Here a diary records the life of an 
unnamed Israeli refugee who, after the fall of the state of Israel in the near future, 
flees the country and settles in Germany. The brutal subjugation of Israel by the 
Arab states is followed by equally brutal military administration – public 
executions of dissidents, rape, robbery, and censorship are widespread. The new 
authoritarian Arab regime imposes a strict curfew and a complete blockade, 
virtually cutting off any contact with the outside world.  
Unlike the two previous novels, the major catastrophe of Israeli society is not 
brought about by religion, and the threat of theocracy and religious 
authoritarianism is not a part of the reality. The destruction of the state forces 
many Israelis to seek asylum in their countries of origin, particularly Germany and 
Poland, as many other countries turn a blind eye to the conflict and refuse to 
accept any Jewish refugees. The story itself opens after the fall of the Jewish state 
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and follows the protagonist on his journey of reclaiming his exilic identity – the 
first step in a sort of reverse metamorphosis that comes full circle at the end of the 
novel, when the exiled Israelis begin to form Zionist organizations in order to 
reconquer their fallen state. 
In contrast to Malakhim Ba’im, the secularism of the exiles is not anti-
religious, as one of the explanations given for the catastrophe is the weakening of 
Israel’s character as a Jewish state. This weakening is identified with the growth 
of materialism and, most importantly, with a loss of Jewish identity among the 
new generation of young Israelis who become disconnected from Jewish history 
and traditions. After the fall, many Israelis eventually reclaim their religious and 
exilic identity. This happens in the context of Poland’s accepting first Jews of 
Polish origin and later only ultra-Orthodox Jewish refugees, who are unlikely to 
engage in political activities, particularly in promoting the return of Jews to Israel, 
and according to the Polish authorities, they thus do not pose a danger to national 
security and are not likely to cause social unrest. Surprisingly, the return of 
secular Israelis to Judaism is presented as a completely natural thing, even though 
many of them had previously been harsh critics of religious coercion.  
The narrative also recounts other, both direct and indirect, causes of the 
national disaster. The major reason for Israel’s defeat and destruction by the Arab 
countries was compromised state security. The new generation of soldiers in the 
Israeli army were weaker and highly unmotivated to fight for their country, which 
was fragmented by internal conflicts and divisions. Israel also became completely 
isolated and lost even its main international partner, the United States, which 
stopped providing arms and diplomatic support for the Jewish State. The 
subsequent economic crisis caused by the general process of social disruption, 
hyperinflation, and the lack of foreign aid only aggravated the already hampered 
ability of the country to protect itself. Another major setback which undermined 
Israel’s strength from within was the internal struggle between the secular and 
religious camps and between different ethnic groups. This eventually led to the 
formation of a deeply divided society unable to protect itself against external 
threats. The calamity, even though not directly connected to Judaism, is in part 
caused by both the adoption and abandonment of religion. The loose identity of 
secular Jews and Judaism’s fixed and dangerous character, the distinct identities 
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of both camps, and their mutual alienation from one another are themes shared by 
both Malakhim Ba’im and Ha-Ḥalom ha-Revi’i.183 
In contrast to the fictional worlds of the previously discussed dystopias, in 
which the future is, for the most part, portrayed realistically, Orly Castel-Bloom’s 
Doli Siti (1992; Dolly City, 2010) imagines a dystopian future which refuses to 
represent the actual world of contemporary Israel in realistic terms, and instead 
presents a world infused with a surreal and postmodernist logic. The novel, 
written a few years after the Lebanon War and during the first years of the First 
Intifada, undermines the traditional relationship between reality and literary 
representation and ultimately provides a critique of Israeli society through 
postmodern skepticism.  
The story, told in the first person, follows the fate of a mother and failed doctor 
named Dolly, who is suffering from violent and constant anxiety over the health 
of her adopted son, Ben, and as a result, she unnecessarily performs invasive 
surgical procedures on him in order to ensure that the boy is not suffering from 
any terminal illness or that he is not missing any of his internal organs. The story 
is deeply disorienting and the meaningless absurdity and mordant satire pose a 
challenge in interpreting the novel. Moreover, Dolly, the deranged protagonist, is 
a quintessential unreliable narrator and the reader is right to question everything 
she says. 
On the surface, the reader is presented with an absurd journey of a mother and 
her son as they come across equally senseless and farcical situations on their way 
across the illusory and insane world, which is always hanging on the edge of 
extinction. Despite the profoundly negative image of the surrounding 
environment, the protagonist is inextricably bound to her world, Dolly City, and it 
is unthinkable for her to try to escape it. The behavior of Dolly is both irrational 
and destructive and the relationship she has with her son and with everyone and 
everything around her symbolizes Israel’s most destructive tendencies. At one 
point in the novel, Dolly argues that if a powerful state like the State of Israel is 
unable to control the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza territories, how can 
anyone expect her to control the occupied territories within her own mind? At 
another place in the novel, she claims that living in Dolly City, an unreal city 
vaguely resembling Tel Aviv, makes one go mad. Indeed, throughout the novel 
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Dolly performs grotesque and insane deeds in a matter-of-fact fashion. She 
casually carries out random killings and, seeing the external world as desperately 
sick, she also performs surgical procedures and excessive inoculations not only on 
living people and animals, but also on inanimate objects. Dolly, seeing cancerous 
growths everywhere, remorselessly destroys whatever she perceives as a threat. 
Here the deterioration and malfunctions of the environment and the human body 
reflect, as in Oz’s Late Love, the maladies and dysfunctions of the country and 
surroundings where the protagonist lives – and by extension, of contemporary 
Israeli society. 
 The metaphorical representations of the aspects of Israeli society are presented 
through Dolly’s relationship with her son and the outside world – it seemingly 
mirrors the attachment of Israeli citizens to their powerful state and its reckless 
policy makers. The Israeli government is parenting its difficult population by 
playing out increasingly destructive fantasies. However, just as Dolly’s bizarre 
and destructive actions never seem to provide complete protection for her child, 
the controversial policies and preventive military actions of the state can never 
really assure safety for its citizens. 
It is possible to discern interesting parallels between the fictional representation 
of Castel-Bloom’s world and that of Jonathan Swift. The idea of using biting 
satire and absurd representations in order to criticize real-world situations is 
shared by both authors. Mockingly representing Great Britain’s cruelty to the 
Irish, Swift, in his A Modest Proposal, talks about Irish babies as an ingredient 
that produces the most delicious meals, while Castel-Bloom’s satirical 
representation of Israel’s relationship with its Jewish population is conveyed, for 
instance, through Dolly’s act of sewing her son to her back, so that she need not 
fear being separated from him.184 
The postmodern elements of randomness, lack of meaning, fragmentation, and 
uncertainty of Dolly City are realized in a fully dystopian Israel, where 
derangement, insanity, and violence rule. It is the meaningful horizon of the near 
future that allows us to see meaning in the present moment, but an abnormal 
future with no clear direction necessarily results in a present which is devoid of 
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intelligibility. The absurd and arbitrary dystopian projection in Dolly City thus 
represents a reality which resists representation.185 
So far, we have discussed dystopias which have a chiefly leftwing sensibility to 
them. This is because the dystopias on the right started to appear only in the 1990s 
following the Oslo Accords – peace agreements between Israel and the 
Palestinians – and other peace-making processes with the neighboring Arab 
countries. The futuristic doomsday scenarios are usually portrayed here as a result 
of Arabs’ and Palestinians’ betrayal of these peace agreements in the future. The 
authors of these kinds of dystopias, often coming from far-right circles, present a 
not completely implausible future projection in which the innocent and peace-
loving Israelis are completely wiped out by the cunning Palestinians.186 
One example which provides a penetrating portrayal of right-wing future 
scenarios may suffice here to illustrate these types of dystopias. Zeev Ben Yosef’s 
Shalom al Yisrael (“Peace unto Israel”) was published in 1995, two weeks before 
the assassination of the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin by an ultranationalist 
opponent of the Oslo peace process. Set in 1945, the novel describes the 
destruction of Israel, which has been co-existing in peace with the Arab world for 
half a century. The dysfunctional state, divided into two autonomous territorial 
districts after giving up a portion of Galilee to the Palestinian State, becomes 
embroiled in internal conflict between devoutly secular Israelis and religious 
Jews. The religious messianic group is concentrated in the regions of Bnei Brak, 
Meah Shearim, and the suburbs of Jerusalem. The internal conflict escalates when 
the religious group begin to demand political and military independence. 
Following decades of internecine struggles, the politically, economically, and 
militarily weakened secularists ask the Palestinians to send their army to help 
restore order. The Palestinians, who have been on friendly terms with them for 
decades, happily send their troops in, but then refuse to leave. It turns out that the 
Palestinians and the whole Arab world never believed in a lasting peace and 
always hoped to destroy the Jewish State when the opportunity arose. 
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The reason given for the internal strife and the weakening of the state’s power 
is the secular leftwing liberal leadership’s adherence to the notion that no state can 
impose its control on any other state or people, even within its own territories. 
Consequently, when the Arabs in Upper Galilee demand to become a part of 
independent Palestine, the government is not very willing to stop their departure 
and the territorial secession. The ultra-Orthodox and messianic segment of society 
later starts to demand independence as well, especially following the liberal 
government’s enforcement of secular-humanist values in the state’s education 
system.  
The Palestinians eventually succeed in destroying Israel with the help of Nazi 
Germany, which by 2045 had regained, together with Japan, its status as a 
superpower. Moreover, using advanced technology, the anti-Semitic Nazis 
manage to rebuild the extermination camps and ghettos of the past to rid the world 
of Jews. Finally, the last surviving Jew wipes out all the Palestinians with a 
futuristic death ray machine that he invented. Thus ends the story, which conveys 
very pessimistic sentiments of a certain part of the right-wing-minded population 
towards any peace process between Jews and Arabs. As articulated in the 
narrative with no intended irony, the destruction of Israel is a result of secularists 
bickering with other Jewish groups while ignoring their real enemy, as well as 
valuing the welfare of all people, rather than placing their own interests and 
welfare first.187 
Finally, we still need to consider one more significant work, a strikingly 
prescient dystopian novel which has at its center a virus sweeping across the 
world and causing a global epidemic, very much like the coronavirus. Hamutal 
Shabtai’s188 powerfully gloomy 2020 was published in 1997 and, set in the United 
States in 2020, follows the lives of several characters as they navigate their way 
through a pandemic and deal with the introduction of increasingly draconian 
legislation on hygiene, which affects all aspects of life. The virus of 2020, very 
much like HIV in that it is transmitted through bodily fluids, has killed millions of 
people over the last 30 years. There is also a not unfounded fear that a lethal new 
strain which is transmitted through respiratory droplets might appear. Regular 
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antigen testing, strict hygienic rules, growing social isolation, and physical 
distancing became the new normal. Shabtai envisions a world divided into two 
groups – healthy people whose lives are defined by a constant fear of contracting 
the virus and infected or at-risk people who are confined to fenced-off areas and 
never allowed to leave.189 
The novel describes an Orwellian global health dictatorship, where people are 
required to be tested every day for the virus, entrances to all public places require 
biometric authentication, alcohol, drugs, and homosexual activities are illegal, and 
extramarital affairs are deemed a serious violation of hygiene. Common places for 
social gatherings such as clubs and bars are banned, androids have leading roles in 
porn movies, and people are obsessed about cleaning products and disinfectants, 
which are advertised on television all night. The authoritarian governments also 
constantly surveil and track people through their phones and computers. 
Hamutal Shabtai’s dystopian future was informed by the AIDS epidemic, 
which was at its height during the 1980s and 1990s. The obsessive and irrational 
fear of contracting HIV, regular and frequent testing, and discrimination against 
people who became infected by the virus are some of the themes the author 
projected into her novel.190 
6.3. Israeli Dystopia in the Twenty-First Century 
Since the start of the third millennium, there has been a literary surge of 
dystopian future visions in Israel. There are three major, often interrelated reasons 
which continue to compel Israeli writers to use this genre: socio-political, 
religious, and environmental. Technological nightmares, while very common in 
English literature, are the least commonly employed element. Several examples of 
each thematic group can be introduced here, but because of a lack of space some 
works need to be omitted. Here we will continue our discussion of the leading 
texts with a thematic approach, concentrating on the most significant dystopian 
texts of the past two decades. 
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The beginning of the 2000s in Israeli history is marked by the second intifada 
and disengagement from Gaza, which have led many to reconsider their 
expectations regarding the future and brought an anxiety-filled horizon with little 
sense of a clear path towards a better and peaceful Middle East. The improbability 
of normalization with the Palestinians, together with the destabilization of Iraq 
and later of Syria, had a deep impact on how the future is imagined. It is important 
to point out, however, that these negative developments which the country faced 
at that time have not necessarily provided a stimulus for a profusion of dystopian 
imagination. Clearly, Israel and its population overcame much more difficult 
problems in the past.191 
Ari Ofengenden, a professor of Hebrew language and literature, argues that 
‘[i]t is precisely the liberal intervention and attendant globalization of the 1990s 
that has undermined the symbolic imagination of a kind of strong nation-state 
developmentalism. It is precisely multiculturalism and individualism as 
background ideology that make historical events that in the past might be 
registered as tolerable sacrifices of nation building into events that lack 
intelligibility. Such events and changes are then exaggerated and projected into 
the near future as dystopian fiction.’192 
A new ethos of consumerism has developed among the middle class recently. It 
has become a social imperative to enjoy oneself, and to tell others about it, 
especially in the sphere of travel and food. Tel Aviv has become a well-known 
site of one of the finest and most sophisticated cuisines in the world, while 
traveling, especially to Asia and South America, has turned into a ‘post-army’ 
ritual. This stands in stark contrast to the humble and local existence of the past. 
This atmosphere of enjoyment and consumerism has obscured the erosion in the 
fulfillment of other basic needs such as job security, affordable housing, adequate 
pensions, open spaces, a lack of noise pollution, and natural habitat.193 Concerns 
regarding the cost of living and deterioration in fields such as healthcare and 
education erupted in the 2011 social justice protests.194 The degradation of the 
environment manifested itself in the creation of numerous sinkholes around the 
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Dead Sea resulting from the dramatic lowering of the sea level, the destruction of 
large areas of forests caused by several extreme wildfires, and the retreat of the 
waterline to dangerously low levels in Lake Tiberias, the only source of drinking 
water in the past. Notwithstanding the fact that the environmental dangers are 
peripheral to the concerns of most Israelis and are taking a back seat to other main 
concerns such as war and economic security, they have contributed to the general 
feeling of precariousness and instability.195  
The common perception among secular Israelis, especially since the 1990s, is 
that the country is undergoing a constant process of religionization (hadata), 
which is manifested in almost all spheres of public life, including the laws and 
practices of marital status, observance of Shabbat, education, and the character of 
the army. This discourse of the fear of religionization among secular Israelis, 
however, stands in sharp contrast to the overwhelming evidence against this 
perception published in numerous studies.196  
Another disruptive element which is in part the source of all these destabilizing 
influences is the marketization and globalization of Israeli society, which 
destroyed previous ways of making sense of reality. According to Ofengenden, 
these phenomena have quickly “devalued the three olds: the old ways of 
production (agriculture, textile, and light industrial production), old ways of 
thinking (nationalism, Zionist socialism), and old ways of culture (state television, 
realism, and secular Zionist culture).”197 The dystopian imagination comes to the 
fore here ‘to articulate both intellectually and emotionally a chaotic present 
lacking a clear progressive future horizon and implicitly calls for political change 
from the present trajectory.’198 
The events of the Second Intifada, which erupted in late September 2000, were 
first filtered seriously into dystopian fiction in Orly Castel-Bloom’s unsettling 
novel Ḥalakim Enoshiyim (2002; Human Parts, 2003). In contrast to the First 
Intifada, in which the Palestinian resistance eventuated in non-lethal violence, the 
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Second Intifada was marked by deadly suicide bombings and resulted in a 
significant number of Israeli civilian casualties. Castel-Bloom’s dystopian 
scenario is dominated here by political, economic, and environmental disasters 
and its grim, hyper-realistic narrative reflects the anxiety, fear, and despair of 
Israeli society during this time. 
Human Parts is set in Israel in the near future, when the country is 
experiencing a series of catastrophic events. After eight years of drought, during 
which all the sources of fresh water have almost dried up, the nation is hit by an 
unprecedentedly harsh winter, during which the temperatures drop close to zero 
and heavy snow which causes the roofs of buildings to collapse comes down even 
in the coastal cities. Snowy days alternate with periods of incessant rain and 
hailstones as big as tennis balls, damaging property and injuring animals and 
people. The extreme weather leads to serious flooding in some areas, forcing 
people to abandon their homes. In a scale that almost evokes Noah and his Ark, 
the roads turn to rivers and sailing ships begin to appear in what were previously 
inland cities, such as Petach Tikva and Kfar Saba.  
The natural calamities are accompanied by an unstable security situation 
following the collapse of the peace process with the Palestinians, who now carry 
out devastating shooting attacks and suicide bombings. Information about human 
parts being scattered on the roads after the daily attacks can be heard in the 
headline news broadcasts. Despite the seriousness of the situation the State of 
Israel adopts a policy of restraint, shying away from a harsh response to the 
terrorist activities.  
In addition to the precarious security situation and harsh weather, the “Saudi 
flu”, a deadly new strain of influenza, is spreading across the country and many 
believe it to be a product of biological weapons developed in Saudi Arabia. The 
country is also experiencing extreme poverty – a large portion of the population 
lives below the poverty line, since the security measures have drained many of the 
available social resources. As a result, the poverty-stricken Israelis, not being able 
to afford heaters and warm clothing, cannot protect themselves against the 
extreme cold. They frequently fall ill and doctors need to amputate the body parts 
affected by gangrene or frostbite. On top of all that, the scientists discover toxic 
chemicals in the drinking water – a problem which is believed to be the result of a 
volcanic eruption somewhere under the sea or in a deeper layer of the Earth. 
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The policy of restraint, the economic and weather conditions, and the spread of 
Saudi flu, we are told, weaken the immune systems of the citizens and result in the 
death of one out of every four people. The hospitals are being overrun with 
patients infected by the flu and terror victims. The record-breaking number of 
deaths overwhelms the cemeteries, which begin to bury the dead in mass graves, 
one on top of another. 
The main storyline takes place in two contrasting cities in central Israel: an 
affluent, Ashkenazi neighborhood in northern Tel Aviv and the impoverished city 
of Lod. The novel describes the lives of several characters trying to survive these 
economic, military, and physical hardships. However, there is no attempt to 
present an in-depth look at the main characters – their lives simply serve to 
indicate how dysfunctional everything is in the Israel of the early 2000s. The 
Israel of Human Parts is once again presented as a depressing and unbearable 
place threatened by death and destruction. There is no way of moving forward and 
a sense of hopelessness and overwhelming despair prevails.199 
The unprecedented Palestinian violence is not given a causal explanation – it is 
simply a horrible situation which happened and Israel and its citizens have to 
suffer through it. In Human Parts Castel-Bloom, influenced by the Israeli world 
of the Second Intifada, describes fragmented episodes of human lives which are 
prematurely cut short and occasionally torn into pieces. The preoccupation of the 
novel with bodily deterioration and death again provides a link between societal 
dysfunction and human physical decay.200 
Amit Zvika’s Kod Kaḥol (2005; Code Blue 2016) unfolds a perfectly plausible 
dystopian vision similar to that of the right-wing military coup in Kenan’s The 
Road to Ein Harod. Set in a near-future Israel in which the withdrawal of Jewish 
settlements in Gaza is already under way, the plot opens as an unnamed Israeli 
prime minister decides that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be resolved by the 
further withdrawal of Jewish settlements from the West Bank and the creation of 
an independent Palestinian State along the pre-1967 borders with land swaps. 
Accordingly, a number of influential figures and organizations work together to 
thwart these measures and to bring about what turns out to be a bloodless military 
takeover. In contrast to Kenan’s novel, where the instigators of the coup are 
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portrayed as murderous fanatics, the major perpetrators in Code Blue are shown in 
a more positive light and as already being a part of the upper echelons of Israel’s 
institutional structures. Indeed, Gavrush, the main protagonist, an ex-kibbutznik 
and the driving force behind the coup, is aided not only by various radicals and 
Jewish religious fundamentalists, who hope for the rebuilding of the Third Temple 
and for the reinstitution of sacrifices, but also by many high-ranking officials, who 
are described as religious settlers from the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, the 
takeover is chiefly successful thanks to the large portion of army officials and 
enlisted military service personnel who are devoutly religious. But Gavrush 
himself is portrayed as a moderate religious settler from the West Bank – prior to 
the takeover he had been a part of the prime minister’s inner circle, meeting with 
him occasionally for friendly briefings. Lacking the ability to foresee the 
consequences of his actions, Gavrush sets in motion changes which quickly take a 
turn for the worse. The rise to power of the religious zealot and army general Ran 
Aviram eventually leads the country to destruction. 
In a televised broadcast, Aviram claims that the country will be founded on 
love for the Torah and for the land of Israel and that a change of government 
needs to happen to avoid civil war and to strengthen the Jewish character of the 
state. But the new regime turns out to be a totalitarian and theocratic dictatorship 
which imposes radicalized religious policies on its citizens. It imposes strict 
censorship of the media under the pretext of safeguarding national security. 
Entertainment venues and public transport are forbidden to operate on Shabbat 
across the whole country and the stores are allowed to sell only kosher food. 
Dissidents are sent to prison camps and the Israeli-Arab population live under 
strict military rule. The new government declares war on terror, reconquers the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, carries out massacres against the Palestinian 
population, and destroys or depopulates many of their villages. 
The book also levels criticism at the left-wing and secular part of Israel’s 
society, which leads a docile life of acquiescence and conformity to the religious 
dictates of the government. This is evidenced in a number of places throughout 
the novel, including the instance when the left shows no resistance to the 
overthrowing of the democratic government and to the subsequent installation of a 
harsh and unrelenting theocratic regime. By and large, this is a realistic dystopia 
which aims to demonstrate that a military takeover is possible when the messianic 
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religious Jews become a majority in the military and political leadership of the 
country. The fictional future world of the novel engages with the Israeli reality of 
2005: it presents characters which are overly familiar from the Israeli public 
sector and alludes to Israel's plan of disengagement from the Gaza Strip.201 
Amnon Rubinstein was born in 1931 and served as a member of the Knesset 
between 1977 and 2002. He was a part of the modernizing elite of Israel that had, 
for many years, a sense of control over the national project, but would later, with 
dramatic changes in the Israeli economy, politics, and culture, become marked by 
concerns regarding continuity and discontinuity. This sense of a lack of control 
and clear direction and its related anxieties also troubles the generation following 
Rubinstein; Hagai Dagan and his Ha-Areẓ Shatah (“The Holy Land Sets Sail”) 
are a fine example.202 
The beginning of Amnon Rubinstein’s dystopian novel Ha-Yam she-Me’alenu 
(“The Sea Above Us,” 2007) is set in a far future in which the coastal city of Tel 
Aviv has been completely submerged under water for years. After that, we 
transition to the near future, in which the sea is slowly rising on Tel Aviv. As the 
city is gradually evacuated by the authorities, the book’s protagonist, Yitzhak 
Ḥalamish, chooses to stay in Tel Aviv and perish with the great flood. His choice 
to die with the flood and with his version of the state carries a symbolic imagery, 
implying a yearning for the ideal Zionist past.203 
The story focuses on the close relationship Yitzhak has with Jumbo, 
a Rwandan refugee who takes care of Yitzhak after his stroke. Jumbo is portrayed 
in the novel as both a big, muscular, happy man, dancing when he walks, and as a 
figure who appears threatening at night for many Israelis. Jumbo is blatantly 
disliked by Yitzhak’s neighbors and son, who calls him Kushi, a Hebrew word 
with strong offensive connotations – the environment in which Jumbo lives is 
clearly marked by racism. On the other hand, the story also emphasizes the 
affinity between the Jews and African refugees – both of which escaped 
a genocide. This affinity comes to a climax when Jumbo brings his daughter home 
and they both sing Zionist songs from her kindergarten. The author, just like the 
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protagonist, is unable to see the story of ‘the Other’ in a way that does not project 
a Zionist narrative onto it.204 
At the end of the book, which is set again in the far future of 2107, we learn 
that the unavoidable flood has become a blessing for Israel, an event that has 
ushered in an era of peace. The peace, however, is not brought about by a two-
state solution, but by the destruction of the infrastructure of the Arab states. 
Nonetheless, there is no reference in the book as to what happened to the 
Palestinians living in Israel today and nor is there a proposal on how they are to 
live together in the same territory. 
The book has three prevalent discourses – national, liberal, and ecological – out 
of which the national Zionist one is the most prominent. The protagonist, Yitzhak 
Ḥalamish, is a national hero who helped Jewish refugees fleeing from Nazi 
persecution. He is from the first out of five generations portrayed in the book that 
are symbolically affirming the continuation of the Zionist enterprise. Unlike the 
Zionist formative themes of constructive transformation, such as breaking from 
the past, negation of the diaspora, and political sovereignty and its subsequent 
aspects of state building and national security, Zionism here becomes a tool for 
conservation and continuity. In the book this continuity seems to be threatened by 
individualism and liberalism – specifically by intermarriage. Rubinstein is 
committed both to liberalism and the freedom of the individual and to Jewish 
continuity, which presents a particular difficulty. This tension between Zionism 
and liberalism is present in a few places throughout the book, because Rubinstein 
believes that intermarriage necessarily leads to nullification of the Jewish 
character of the state. The very inclusion of such narratives in the story reveals the 
anxieties in Israeli society regarding the clash between individualism and 
nationalism. The most prevalent theme in the book, however, is the relationship 
between Zionism and the ecological danger posed by the rise in the sea level, 
which structures the entire story. Unlike many other ecological threats, the rising 
sea level has very little to do with national policy and a lot to do with the global 
effects of greenhouse gas emissions, which are outside any national economic and 
military interest. It is unclear what caused Rubinstein to use a global disaster to 
tell a national story. In one interview, Rubinstein admits that he is using this 
specific ecological catastrophe to express his existential anxiety – the threat of 
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nuclear war with Iran. Existential anxiety thus shifts from security to ecology. 
Virtually, Rubinstein uses a fashionable ecological discourse to deal with the 
anxieties of Jewish continuity in the Middle East and in his book, he ultimately 
reassures his readership with regard to the continuity of Jewish existence.205 
Natural catastrophe looms larger in Hagai Dagan’s Ha-Areẓ Shatah (2008). 
The hero of the book, a secular ex-kibbutznik called Elad, is on his way to a 
reunion with his classmates from the kibbutz, where he hopes to find his long-lost 
love, Violeta. The longing for Violeta symbolizes his nostalgic reminiscing for a 
more youthful and innocent Israel. The reunion, however, ends with an 
unexplained earthquake that ruptures the land all through the Great Rift Valley. 
Consequently, the land of Israel is split from the mainland and sets sail on a 
mysterious voyage that ends up touching the shores of Norway. The book tells 
less a story about the hero than a story about a land that is burdened and exhausted 
by religion, history, national claims, and, most importantly, by its population, but 
is ultimately sailing northward to Europe, breaking from its holiness and cooling 
the national, religious, and racial fires that devour it. The nostalgic Zionist love of 
the land that the hero is trying to access proves to be inaccessible as the other 
main characters are either settlers who are depicted as violent in their love for the 
land or entrepreneurs who are trying to generate a profit out of it. In both 
narratives, The Land is Sailing and The Sea Above Us, we are presented with a 
vision of Israel moving to a politically more stable place. In Rubinstein’s story the 
stable place is the Arab Middle East accepting Israel out of impotence, whereas in 
Dagan’s story Israel drifts out from the whole region altogether. Both dystopias 
therefore end in a kind of unbelievable, but wishful utopia, fulfilling 
normalization of Israel.206 
The theme of environmental destruction also dominates Assaf Gavron’s 
Hidromanyah (“Hydromania,” 2008), a post-apocalyptic and corporate eco-
dystopia set in a decimated Israel, which has virtually shrunk to a mere enclave 
after losing its wars with the Palestinian state. The narrative stretches across a 
year in a far future, from 2067 to 2068 – a symbolic date which marks the 120th 
anniversary of the establishment of Israel. The worst-case scenarios for climate 
change and global warming have already come to pass. The entire world has been 
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devasted by extreme drought, leaving only a limited amount of water resources. 
The annual rainfall is extremely low and strictly controlled by the use of futuristic 
cloud technology. Following dramatic political, social, and cultural 
transformations and bloody military conflicts over land and water, a new world 
order is established on the basis of control over the water supplies. The American 
and Western influence over the world have greatly diminished and China, Japan, 
and Ukraine have emerged as new superpowers, sharing out the scarce water 
resources. These are controlled by giant and powerful international corporations, 
which sell water for wildly inflated prices. The corporations also possess 
knowledge and the ability to purify water. The short strip along the Mediterranean 
Sea which Israel has turned into is facing a severe water shortage and much of the 
remaining fresh water is badly polluted. There is also a general shortage of basic 
foodstuffs and commodities such as coffee, chocolate, Coca-Cola, cigarettes, and 
alcohol because either they trigger a feeling of thirst or their production requires 
extensive amounts of irrigation.207 
Countries in this fictional world wage wars for the last drop of water. Thus, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict now has less to do with territorial disputes and much 
more to do with control over the remaining water reservoirs. Jerusalem has been 
the capital of Palestine since 2030 and in the armed conflict raging in the course 
of the novel Israel loses control over Tiberias and the Sea of Galilee, leaving 
Caesarea as the last major city within its borders. In fact, Caesarea and the 
surrounding districts are all that is left from the State of Israel and much of the 
population is reduced to the status of refugees. Moreover, the impoverished Israeli 
enclave is under the increasing influence of China, with Chinese scientists and 
businessmen practically controlling the whole region. The population is managed 
and monitored by microchip implants which enable access to various services on 
the basis of an individual’s financial situation. The citizens are only allowed to 
buy water sold by the powerful corporations and the surveillance system, in the 
style of Big Brother, helps the authorities to enforce the ban on the private storage 
of water. The microchips also connect with special augmented reality smartglasses 
which are designed to enhance real-world experiences and make communication 
with others easier. The gradual withdrawal into virtual reality causes people to 
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become alienated from one another and therefore, we are told, the collective 
strength and organizational skills of the Jewish people have been lost. This was 
the root cause of their passive acceptance of the situation, as well as their inability 
to protect themselves from military aggression by the Palestinians. 
The protagonist here, a former employee of the Ministry of Finance called 
Maya, is married to Ido, a water engineer who mysteriously disappears one day 
after inventing an apparatus named “Ji-Ji” which enables people to collect and 
purify rainwater themselves without having to rely on the ruthless water 
corporations. The narrative then follows Maya’s attempt to deal with her 
worsening financial situation, pregnancy, the police investigation regarding the 
disappearance of her husband, and her effort to fight against the water 
corporations by carrying out her husband’s project in his absence and setting up a 
huge filtration and storage facility for rainwater in the re-established kibbutz of 
Ein Harod. 
The current political-social-environmental themes take a backseat in this 
science fiction-oriented eco-thriller. Despite the great advances in science and 
technology, Hidromanyah presents a scorched and impoverished world dominated 
by capitalist monopolies which exploit natural resources and a world of virtual 
sociability in which genuine human relationships and the collective Israeli-Jewish 
identity have largely been eroded. Privacy, many freedoms, and material luxuries 
are things of the past. Although the end is dystopian and does not provide us with 
any hope, the novel carries an important ecological message and warns us about 
the possible consequences of an environmental catastrophe.208 
We return to religion with Avivit Mishmari’s Ha-Zaken Hishtage’a (“The Old 
Man Lost his Mind,” 2013), a mixture of social satire and a more plausibly 
realistic dystopia, which portrays a near-future Israel in the grip of a civil war 
between religious and secular Jews. The novel evokes a different type of imagery 
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from the earlier religious dystopias, as much of the story is told from the point of 
view of an omniscient narrator and the conflict itself is largely a media event 
rooted in television broadcasts, news reports, and rumors. The televised 
dichotomy and confrontations between the religious and secular groups stand in 
marked contrast to people’s actual relationships. The novel’s numerous characters, 
who are given characteristic nicknames but, overall, not much literary depth, are 
crafted with finer nuance and their identities cannot be easily classified along the 
lines of religious-secular hostilities. Moreover, the narrator describes the comic 
characters and the dystopian reality in a critical and sarcastic way, rather than 
giving a gloomy account of the gruesomeness of the grotesque conflict which is so 
characteristic of many of the previously discussed dystopias. 
The narrative opens with a televised speech of a veteran politician, dubbed the 
Old Man, who calls on Israel’s secular population to rise up against the religious 
citizens, both ultra-Orthodox and messianic settlers, and their power of coercion. 
Here the Old Man represents the early strong and secular leadership of the 
country, the likes of David Ben-Gurion. The government in this future reality has 
been becoming increasingly religious for the past few years and the secularists are 
losing political power. The secular prime minister is described as weak, 
hedonistic, and nothing more than a mere puppet, manipulated by the religious 
leaders. The conflict that erupts leads to organized massacres of religious Jews, 
the burning down of synagogues and houses in religious neighborhoods, the 
looting of religious shops, and general violence all over the country. The doctors 
and paramedics are divided among themselves, providing medical treatment only 
to patients from the streams to which they belong. The country is on the brink of 
economic collapse and the government and army are too dysfunctional to bring an 
end to the raging conflict.209 
The reasons for the war seem rather arbitrary and accidental, an explanation for 
the outburst is absent, and the reports on the ensuing mayhem are based on the 
media and rumors. The nature of these reports comes into question when the 
readership is introduced to specific characters in the story, such as a traditional 
religious couple of oriental origin who protect a secular person from an attack by 
yeshivah students. Another female character is portrayed as a former religious 
 
209 Hanna Herzig, ‘Ma Yikreh ke-she-Tifroẓ Poh Milḥemet Aḥim', Haaretz, 23 June 2013, 
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Orthodox person, but her withdrawal from the religious world is not a complete 
one. She does not represent a full rift, but rather a bridge between the two 
seemingly hostile worlds. The events of the conflict are also varied, with some 
secular people, for instance, helping children from Orthodox neighborhoods who 
remain homeless after the fighting. In other words, the portrayal of the conflict as 
a battle between good and evil is only present in the media coverage and seems 
rather loosely connected to the reality which we are presented with. The life in 
Mishamari’s novel seems much more complex and variegated than the media 
wants us to believe. The story’s characters cannot be easily classified as either 
secular or religious and the hostilities are not construed purely on the basis of the 
animosity felt by the secularists towards the religious camp. Instead, it is 
corruption, poverty, ethnic tensions, and political instability which play a 
significant role here.210 
We approach a purer form of science fiction in Shimon Adaf’s Kefor (“Frost”, 
2010), a post-apocalyptic dystopia set in 2510, which describes humanity as it 
struggles to survive following a global disaster. The catastrophic event has killed 
hundreds of millions of people and destroyed vast amounts of scientific and 
cultural knowledge accumulated throughout human history. In the process of 
recovery, a post-human generation of cyborgs and androids emerges. All the 
world’s societies become half-human and half-machine and an intelligent 
supercomputer helps them in the government of their societies and with the 
accumulation of lost knowledge.  
After five hundred years of exile, the remaining Jews are assigned a special 
role within this post-apocalyptic world and they gather together from around the 
world to reestablish the Jewish state. They join together to rebuild the future Tel 
Aviv, the only city which has survived the destruction of Israel and the whole 
Middle East. The new society living in the secluded walled city-state is purely 
Jewish and governed by religious leaders. It is ruled by strict religious laws from 
the time of the Second Temple and is the only society on earth that outlaws 
interbreeding between humans and machines; the inhabitants are forbidden to mix 
with both non-Jews and those who are not fully human. The regime strictly 
prohibits the creation and dissemination of poetry which is not religious and 
approved in advance by the rabbis. The narrative itself follows several characters, 
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including a non-Jewish woman, a scientist, and a poet who must, in the light of all 
the regulations and prohibitions, hide from the religious authorities. The plot also 
revolves around a mysterious new disease that causes some yeshiva students to be 
transformed into creatures with wings and sharp teeth – angel-like creatures 
similar to seraphim. The earlier dystopian visions of Jewish theocracy, such as 
Ben-Ner’s Malakhim Ba’im and Tammuz’s Pundako shel Yirmiyahu, are here 
brought into a futuristic extreme with Jewish religious fanatics ruling over Tel 
Aviv, only this time, the future society is not divided into secular and religious 
camps and the Arab population is long gone. We find only deviant rebels who 
fight the system.211 
Adaf’s Shadrach (2017) is another novel which combines science fiction, post-
apocalyptic, and dystopian scenarios. The narrative of this slim novel cuts back 
and forth between a post-apocalyptic far future Israel, in which the protagonist is 
a teenager named Shadrach, and the Israel of the 1980s, in which the main 
character’s name is Hananiah. The names are a clear reference to the biblical book 
of Daniel, in which one of Daniel’s three companions, Hananiah, whose 
Babylonian name is Shadrach, is thrown into a fiery furnace and comes out of it 
alive. The narrative line of Shadrach is set in an unspecified far future in which a 
catastrophic event befalls the Jewish state. This happens when Shadrach, living in 
Tel Aviv, goes to visit his family in New Sderot for the summer. Israel is bombed 
by Americans with nano-gas that makes the inhabitants go crazy, virtually 
transforming them into bloodthirsty zombies. The cities of New Sderot and Gaza 
are saved by means of a protective dome which stretches over this territory. In the 
course of the complete mayhem following the chemical attack, a nationalistic 
right-wing faction called the Guardians of Zion and supported by the Americans 
seizes power. The new authoritarian government abounds with Jewish symbols 
and calls itself Zionist, but it has no memory or knowledge of the Jewish past and 
the sources from which these symbols derive – the understanding of the Hebrew 
language is disconnected from its etymology and the burdensome history. The 
new government also fights wars with the Palestinians, without remembering the 
cause of the conflict. As time goes by, Shadrach volunteers to go back in time 
using a supertechnology that simulates the past in order to collect information. 
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Instead, his consciousness is somehow sent back in time to the year 1987, and 
here he melds with the mind of a young boy named Hananiah. Shadrach realizes 
that he is not in a simulation of the past any more, and trapped there, he tries to 
find out why. The central message of the novel stands out clearly – in order to 
understand the present, we need to understand the past, that is to say, the biblical 
story of Shadrach and Hananiah.212 
The traditional theme of Jewish theocracy predominates again in Yishai Sarid’s 
Ha-Shlishi (“The Third,” 2015) and Dror Burstein’s Tit (2016; Muck, 2018), in 
which the focal point is the holy city of Jerusalem and the Jewish Temple. Both 
novels portray a dystopian version of a Temple-centered Jerusalem whose corrupt 
and megalomaniac leadership brings about its ultimate destruction. The story of 
Ha-Shlishi is narrated in the form of a journal, which is found after the destruction 
of the Kingdom of Judah. The journal belongs to a prince, Jonathan, who is 
imprisoned in a fortress in Jaffa and awaits execution after the Judean kingdom 
was destroyed by the modern version of the Amalekites – the eternal biblical 
enemies of the ancient Israelites, representing here perhaps the Arabs/Palestinians. 
Combining a biblical past and a dystopian future, the book presents a cyclical 
narrative of destruction-redemption-destruction.  
Jonathan’s journal chiefly describes the short-lived kingdom of Judah and the 
Third Jewish Temple, focusing particularly on the religious practices and 
sacrificial rituals. Jonathan also briefly recounts the apocalyptic events which 
preceded the establishment of the kingdom: the coastal cities of Haifa and Tel 
Aviv are razed to the ground following a nuclear strike by the Amalekites. The 
survivors unite on the Judean hills behind a new leader, Jonathan’s father Jehoaz, 
who, acting in the name of a divine revelation, drives the Amalekites out of 
Jerusalem and the surrounding areas in a war of redemption. Jehoaz gathers his 
troops, demolishes the shrines on the Temple Mount, and, using advanced 
equipment, discovers the lost Ark of the Covenant and inside it, the Tablets of the 
Law. Encouraged by this divine validation, the Third Temple is rebuilt and Jehoaz 
becomes the king-savior and High Priest. Meanwhile, the international community 
imposes an embargo on the kingdom for driving out the Amalekites. The new 
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kingdom implements strict religious laws, instills a fear of secularism, and 
proclaims that the cause of the destruction of Tel Aviv and Haifa was the 
hedonistic and blasphemous lifestyle of their inhabitants.  
 Prince Jonathan, Jehoaz’s youngest child, is seriously wounded by a grenade 
during an attempted assassination of his father by the Amalekites. The explosion 
leaves him with a limp and incapable of fathering children. The physical 
deformity also disqualifies him from serving in the Temple, but an exception is 
made and Jonathan becomes responsible for animal sacrifices and writing the 
Temple chronicles. He describes the worship and sacrificial rituals meticulously in 
great detail using biblical language. While other priests enjoy the consumption of 
leftover meat from the sacrifices, Jonathan is repulsed by the gruesome slaughters 
and becomes a vegetarian. To enter the Temple premises and offer an atonement 
sacrifice, all citizens of the Kingdom of Judah must have a microchip implanted in 
the back of their neck during their first year of life, which is used for identification 
of their status as descendants of Judah and also to preserve the purity of the 
pilgrims and the land. The majority of the population is impoverished and forced 
to bring sacrificial offerings to the Temple, while the priests and royalty lead 
luxurious lives. 
As the story unfolds, Jonathan gradually loses faith in his father and realizes 
that he never truly cared for him. It becomes clear that Jehoaz only cares for 
himself when we learn that during Jonathan’s childhood, the king dodged the 
grenade and allowed his son to get hurt instead. The relationship between the two 
deteriorates further when Jehoaz marries his second wife Efrat, who was 
originally intended to marry Jonathan. The story culminates shortly before the 
destruction of the kingdom and its Temple at the hands of the Amalekites after its 
short 23 years of existence. As the missiles fall on the city, the masses demand a 
special human sacrifice to appease God into saving the kingdom. The king 
therefore hands his new-born baby from Efrat to Jonathan and demands that he 
kills his infant brother as a sacrifice. Jonathan refuses, kills his father instead, 
takes the baby, and runs away from Jerusalem as it is being destroyed by the 
hostile forces. He is later captured, imprisoned, and sentenced to death. In his 
journal, Jonathan writes about a God who does not like to be locked up in the 
Holy of Holies, a God who has no interest in the blood and burning flesh of the 
sacrifices, and a God who is angry at the self-important king as he transgresses the 
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religious laws with impunity. The sacrifices and the Temple are ultimately 
portrayed as not providing the benefit they were intended for – God, it seems, is 
not interested in the barter approach any more.213 
The novel’s dystopian scenario exploring the idea of rebuilding the Temple and 
reinstituting animal sacrifices seeks to question the significance and relevance of 
such an attempt in our current reality. However, Sarid’s fictional world is not 
purely a fantastic philosophical-religious thought experiment, as the discourse 
concerned with the rebuilding of the Temple is a reality among the radical 
religious-messianic circles. The attempts to resume sacrifices on the Temple 
Mount are also a part of the current Israeli reality – there were incidents in the 
past when the Israeli police arrested suspects in the Old City who were planning 
to sacrifice animals on the Temple Mount.214 
A futuristic portrayal of the Judean kingdom and the Temple also marks Dror 
Burnstein’s Muck, which combines the past, present, and future worlds as it 
describes the life of a prophet of doom, Jeremiah. Like those of his biblical 
counterpart, Jeremiah’s prophecies about the downfall of the kingdom are not 
accepted by his audience and the corrupted Jerusalem is destroyed. The narrative 
connects the geopolitical reality of the First Temple period with descriptions and 
images of the present-day world, projecting it into an unspecified future. The 
novel can therefore be interpreted as a biting critique of contemporary Israeli 
society. 
Burstein’s old-new and post-Yom Kippur War Jerusalem, where people travel 
on light railways and talk on cellphones, is the capital city of Judah, a vassal 
kingdom torn between two regional powers: the Babylonian Empire led by 
Nebuchadnezzar and the Egyptian Kingdom led by Pharaoh. The story opens with 
the reign of King Jehoiakim, who is a vassal to both nations and is required to pay 
heavy tributes in exchange for peace. As the plot unfolds Jehoiakim stops paying 
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the tribute to the Babylonians, which prompts a military response from the 
Babylonian king, who lays siege to the city. Before the Babylonians seize 
Jerusalem, King Jehoiakim kills himself and his son Jehoiachin becomes the new 
reigning king of Judah. Nebuchadnezzar, arriving in a black Mercedes and 
accompanied by an army of tanks and helicopters, captures the city shortly after 
Jehoiachin’s coronation and deposes him as king. The upper class of the Judean 
population is exiled to Babylon together with Jehoiachin and his uncle Mattaniah 
is installed as king by Nebuchadnezzar under the name Zedekiah.   
The central characters of the story are Jeremiah and Mattaniah-Zedekiah – who 
both start as poets, become friends, and in the last part of the novel confront each 
other as prophet and king. The novel portrays corrupted Judean rulers, religious 
functionaries, and military officials who lead a hedonistic lifestyle, employ a 
system of spies, and exercise strict control over the population. The kingdom is at 
constant war with internal dissidents, including false prophets, and external 
enemies such as the Sidonians. When Mattaniah-Zedekiah is proclaimed king, he 
too gradually becomes corrupted by his rise to power and eventually goes mad as 
he randomly demolishes buildings, enacts irrational laws, and focuses on his 
personal well-being while his people are suffering and dying from shortages, 
diseases, and crime waves while the city is being besieged. In the novel Jerusalem 
is portrayed as a city of moral decay, social injustice, and corruption where 
violence, gambling, slavery, and the trading of children are common sights.215 
A completely different approach to envisioning the dystopian future is 
articulated in Sayed Kashua’s (post-) apocalyptic Va-Yehi Boker (Let It Be 
Morning, 2006), published in 2004 at the height of the Second Intifada, which 
challenges the distinction between the Israeli utopia and dystopia. The story is 
recounted of the military blockade of a Palestinian village by the Israeli army, 
after which a peace treaty is signed between the Palestinians and Israelis and the 
village, populated mostly by Israeli-Arabs, becomes part of the Palestinian State. 
The Zionist utopia of erasing the Palestinian space and its inhabitants turns here 
into an Israeli-Arab dystopia. 
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The unnamed protagonist-narrator of the story, very much like the author 
himself, is an Israeli-Arab journalist writing in Hebrew who becomes stuck 
between his two ethnic-national identities. With the ongoing Palestinian uprising 
and increase in anti-Arab incitement, the readership for his articles diminishes and 
the ones he manages to publish are heavily censored. After many years spent 
working in Jewish Israel, the hero is therefore forced to move back to his native 
village. It is, however, not the safe haven he had hoped for – the village turns out 
to be a dangerous place rampant with crime and street gangs that attack random 
bystanders. He also dislikes the increased Islamic religiosity of the place and the 
narrow-mindedness of its inhabitants. One day, shortly after the protagonist 
returns to his family home, the Israeli military lays siege to the village, isolating it 
completely from the outside world. The main narrative then goes on to describe 
how the protagonist and the villagers cope with the blockade. The village suffers 
from food, water, and electricity shortages, telephone lines and the internet are cut 
off, and riots and looting break out over the worsening conditions. The reason 
behind the blockade is thought by the village leaders to be the illegal Palestinian 
workers from the Occupied Territories, as they continue to believe that Israel 
cannot be targeting its own Israeli-Arab citizens. The whole siege is therefore 
viewed throughout the novel as a misunderstanding – a blurring of the lines which 
separate the Israeli-Arabs and Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.  
The novel ends as the blockade is suddenly lifted and everything returns to 
normal. The military withdraws and the telephone and internet connection is 
restored. A historic peace treaty is signed between the Israelis and Palestinians. It 
involves an exchange of territory and populations – Israel gives up East Jerusalem 
and a large portion of the West Bank, but the villagers, including the protagonist, 
respond to the treaty with disbelief as they are now a part of the Palestinian state 
and no longer Israelis. The majority of the villagers clearly reject their new 
Palestinian nationality. The Zionist dream has been accomplished, the State of 
Israel is now one hundred percent Jewish, but this is not a utopian achievement for 
the ousted Israeli-Arab population. The end is clearly dystopian for the Arab 
minority, which is often considered to be a fifth column in the contemporary 
Israeli society.216 
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The literary dystopias provide their authors with the means to confront social, 
economic, and political transformations and the main objective of dystopian 
narratives is to educate us and warn us about possible futures we would wish to 
avoid. The central themes that helped to shape the dystopian genre, such as 
governmental control, corporate dictatorships, destructive ideologies, the dangers 
posed by technology and science, the collapse of civil order, ecological disasters, 
and others, are also represented in the Israeli dystopian tradition. The examination 
of Israeli dystopian novels shows, however, that the narratives have a distinctly 
Jewish character – the Jewish dystopias, for the most part, reflect the fears and 
anxieties Israeli Jews have about the future rather than the universal human 
experience. These dystopias relate to Jewish history and sources, are almost 
exclusively set in an imaginary future State of Israel, and have Jewish characters 
as the main protagonists. Hamutal Shabtai’s 2020 and Sayed Kashua’s Let It Be 
Morning are some exceptions here, as the two novels are not concerned with 
specifically Jewish dystopian futures.  
The thesis also explored what agitated the Israeli authors to produce such 
nightmarish scenarios and why they have come to occupy an increasingly 
prominent role in Israeli society. The Israeli dystopian narratives started to appear 
in the 1970s and proliferated throughout the 1980s. Written by left-wing authors, 
the dystopias of this period contain warnings about the potential for the 
destruction of Zionist utopian values – secularism and liberalism. Here the 
gloomy futures portray authoritarian Jewish theocracies or violent militarized 
societies. A fanatical form of religion often plays a crucial role in the overthrow of 
the system and the relationship between secular and religious Jews is represented 
in dichotomous terms. The internal anxieties, rooted in the transformation of the 
political and cultural make-up of Israel in the 1970s, are also reinforced by the 
external anxieties Israeli Jews have been confronted with since the creation of 
Israel – the destruction of the Jewish state and subsequent extermination of its 
inhabitants in a future war with the Arab countries. 
In the last decade of the twentieth century, the Lebanon War, the First 
Intifada, and the peace process come to dominate the dystopian projections. The 
extensive transformative processes, such as multiculturalization, globalization, 
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privatization, and the collapse of Zionist meta-narratives culminated in the 1990s 
and led to cultural and political fragmentation and the development of an ethos of 
individualism and consumerism. Thus, the traditional ways of making sense of 
reality have almost completely collapsed. The sense of no progress, rationality, 
and meaning was first reflected in Orly Castel-Bloom’s Dolly City, which uses 
postmodern poetics in its portrayal of a dystopian future. For the first time, we 
also witness the emergence of future projections which have right-wing 
sensibilities to them – here the authors convey their anxiety about the peace 
processes initiated between Israel and the Palestinians.  
The twenty-first century has only reinforced the sense of the absence of a 
clear path towards a better future. However, there is a clear thematic shift from 
Israeli dystopian thinking in the 1980s. The fear of an all-out war with the Arab 
enemy recedes into the background and the internal anxieties are portrayed in a 
more nuanced form. Ultra-Orthodox and messianic religiosity is still a focal point 
of many dystopias, but the horrifying futures are seldomly imagined in terms of a 
struggle between extreme secularism and extreme religiosity. Moreover, 
environmental disasters begin to play a major role in some Israeli dystopias, 
reflecting rising ecological awareness and the critical attitude Israeli society has 
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